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Making Biomedical Policy 
through Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Example 
of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Carl E. Schneider 
Throughout most of American history no one would have supposed biomed-
ical policy could or should be made through constitutional adjudication. No 
one would have thought that the Constitution spoke to biomedical issues, 
that those issues were questions of federal policy, or that judges were com-
petent to handle them. Today, however, the resurgence of substantive due 
process has swollen the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the distinc-
tion between federal and state spheres is tattered, and few statutes escape 
judicial vetting. Furthermore, Abraham Lincoln's wish that the Constitution 
should "become the political religion of the nation" has been granted. "We 
now reverently refer to the Supreme Court as the great arbiter of American 
moral life, as performing a 'prophetic function,' as expressing what 'we stand 
for as a people. "'1 Its Justices are invoked as "moral teachers who help to 
shape the character of our nation."2 How could our most perplexing ethical 
issues not be confided to such an institution? 
My first purpose in this chapter is to consider that question, to ask 
whether constitutional adjudication is a good way to make biomedical policy. 
My answer-in its briefest, bluntest form-is no. I believe biomedical policy 
is generally better made-is better informed, better structured, more re-
sponsive, wiser, and more legitimate-when it is made by the whole range 
of governmental agencies Oegislatures, administrative agencies, referenda, 
courts interpreting statutes and the common law), and semiofficial and 
nonofficial institutions and individuals (commissions like the New York Task 
Force on Life and the Law, professional associations like the American As-
sociation of Bioethicists and the American Medical Association, voluntary as-
sociations like churches, and individuals like scholars, doctors, patients, and 
families). These actors and agencies will not produce perfect law; they may 
not even produce good law. But they are likelier to do better than courts act-
ing as interpreters of the Constitution. 
My vehicle for this argument is the cases deciding whether there is a 
constitutional right to assistance in committing suicide, particularly the 
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Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying v Washington3 and the 
Supreme Court's reversal of that decision in Washington v Glucksberg. 4 My 
principal exhibit will be Compassion in Dying. It is the high-water mark of 
the constitutional claim and the culmination of exceptionally thorough judi-
cial consideration: The District Court found Washington's prohibition of as-
sisted suicide unconstitutional; the Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel re-
versed; and the Ninth Circuit en bane reversed the panel by a vote of eight 
to three in a long and detailed opinion. Compassion in Dying, in short, prob-
ably represents as considered a job as a court is likely to achieve in setting 
biomedical policy through constitutional adjudication. It therefore repays 
careful inspection. 
An obvious objection to the argument against making biomedical policy 
through constitutional adjudication is that, for better or worse, the Constitu-
tion creates rights courts must enforce, that courts thus cannot escape mak-
ing biomedical policy, and that it is thus not worth asking whether constitu-
tional adjudication will yield sound biomedical policies. I have several 
answers to this objection. First, I rather quaintly doubt the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates a constitutional right of privacy of the kind the Court 
has created. This is a well-worn controversy, and I need only say here that 
the reasons for my doubts are conventional ones, including the interpretive 
leap such a right requires, the difficulties the Supreme Court has had artic-
ulating and defining that right, and the power the right gives unelected 
courts. Perhaps somewhat less conventionally, I also believe the problems 
with constitutional adjudication I will describe are relevant to whether a pri-
vacy right should be read into the Constitution. 
Second, my arguments should be relevant even to someone who finds a 
privacy right in the Fourteenth Amendment because they speak to some un-
resolved issues in the law of substantive due process. For example, even if 
there is a privacy right, the capacity of courts to handle biomedical questions 
well should affect our view of the right's scope: The privacy right is a judicial 
creation; it should be one judges can interpret and implement effectively 
and intelligently. Furthermore, my arguments speak to a persistent but ne-
glected problem in Fourteenth Amendment analysis-how governmental in-
terests should be evaluated.5 
Third, I will ask not just whether corstitutional adjudication is a good 
way of making public policy, but also whether, under current constitutional 
doctrine, statutes that make it a crime to help someone commit suicide are 
unconstitutional. I will primarily contend that the state's interests are strong 
enough to make those statutes constitutional even if there is some kind of 
privacy right to assisted suicide. 
In sum, this chapter serves this volume's goals in several ways. First, it 
asks an important question about any issue of public policy-which institu-
tions are best eptrusted with the decision? More particularly, it joins the 
controversy over the role of courts as an instrument of public policy.6 Sec-
ond, it contributes to the debate on the scope of the right of privacy and on 
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how state interests should be treated in Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
Third, it comments on the constitutional strength of the state's interests in 
making it criminal to assist in a suicide. Finally, it speaks to the question 
whether assisted suicide should be forbidden as a matter of public policy. 
Since this chapter is lengthy, let me summarize its argument here. I will 
not contend that constitutional adjudication must inevitably reach the 
wrong result in bioethical cases. The Supreme Court in Glucksberg reached 
the right one, even though the Court was divided and several of its mem-
bers-perhaps a majority-warned that somewhat different facts might have 
led them to a critically different result. I will argue, rather, that constitu-
tional adjudication is ill-equipped to make good bioethical policy. This is par-
ticularly a problem where a court finds that a statute is unconstitutional, for 
then the court substitutes its judgment for the legislature's and ordinarily at-
tempts to sketch a new policy. 
I will argue that there is little reason to prefer a court's judgment and 
much reason to doubt its ability to craft sound policy. More particularly, I will 
suggest that the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence are poor in 
guidance for making bioethical policy and that judges' training and experi-
ence hardly remedy this defect. Worse, litigation commonly fails to furnish 
judges the information they need for evaluating statutes intelligently. To il-
lustrate this point, I will scrutinize the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the in-
terests the state asserted in Compassion in Dying. I will then propose that 
these judicial handicaps are exacerbated by much in the culture of Ameri-
can law. I will conclude by arguing that other institutions are better placed 
to make-and indeed are already making-policy governing assisted suicide 
than are courts. 
How Well Equipped Are Judges to Make Policy? 
Judges interpreting the Constitution might make good policy for two rea-
sons-because the Constitution states good principles for public policy and 
provides a good framework for analyzing social issues or because judges' 
training, experience, and procedures give them insight into what policy 
should be. Neither of these conditions fits matters of biomedical policy. 
First, the absence of any textual commission from the Constitution 
means the Justices are thrown back on their own resources in making policy. 
In privacy law, those resources have produced a perfectly worthy desidera-
tum-autonomy. Yet by itself autonomy is no guide to policy. Autonomy, yes. 
But in what quantities, in what places, and at what costs?7 The Justices have 
found no satisfactory way to turn a banality into a workable principle: Auton-
omy is notoriously a greedy concept, but the Court cannot define its limits. 
Autonomy is notoriously one good among many, but the Court cannot articu-
late a sound method for accommodating it to other goods. 
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Consider the announced principles of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 
First, a court decides whether a statute infrtnges a fundamental right. If it 
does, it is constitutional only ifit is "necessary" to serve a "compelling" state 
interest. If the statute does not infringe a compelling state interest, it is con-
stitutional if it simply serves a "legitimate" state interest. Much depends, 
then, on how one decides what rights are fundamental. However, even after 
several decades of modern substantive due process, that decision remains 
embarrassingly manipulable. For example, the Court ritually says it begins 
"by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."8 But 
everything turns on the specificity of that examination: Define the right nar-
rowly and it will rarely look "fundamental." Justice Scalia was correct in his 
concurrence in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health when he 
denied that suicide had ever been thought a right9 and in his opinion for the 
plurality in Michael H. v Gerald D. 10 when he said Americans had never 
imagined a right to adultery. But the Court has not always employed Justice 
Scalia's narrow definition of history and tradition. Had it done so in Roe v 
Wade, for example, it could hardly have derived a fundamental right to abor-
tion.11 Yet if one broadens one's definition of the right and asks whether 
there is a history and tradition of protecting autonomy or of a "right to be left 
alone," virtually any claim may be alchemized into a fundamental right. 
This dilemma might lead us into despondency about the history-and-
traditions test and toward a more conventional lawyer's approach-inferring 
principles from precedent and then using the principle to guide decisions. 
The most celebrated such attempt-one seized on by the Ninth Circuit in 
Compassion in Dying-is from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v Casey: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 12 
Perhaps this rhapsody is inspiring; it is hardly instructive. The Court in 
Glucksberg responded to it sensibly: "That many of the rights and liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not 
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and 
personal decisions are so protected, ... and Casey did not suggest other-
wise." 13 But then what principle should be inferred from the cases? The 
Court does not try to say. And how could it? What consistent principle 
should be inferred from cases that hold, for instance, that private sexual ac-
tivities may be criminalized14 but that most abortions may not be? 
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Like the formulations for evaluating fundamental rights, the tests for as-
sessing the state's interests are mightily manipulable. A statute that inter-
feres with a "fundamental right" must be "necessary" to promote a "com-
pelling" state interest. What do those Delphic terms mean? The Court never 
says. "Compelling" languishes in mystery, since the Court rarely uses it to 
decide cases. "Necessary" has meant first that there is no less offensive way 
of reaching the statute's goal and second that the statute is neither under-
nor overinclusive. Since no statute fully meets either criterion, few statutes 
that infringe a fundamental right have 'scaped whipping. 15 
As privacy jurisprudence developed, it became clear that the decision 
whether a fundamental right had been infringed was virtually dispositive. 
This seemed an embarrassing betrayal of the test the Court had promul-
gated, and it promoted an impoverished analysis. Gradually, the Court de-
vised an intermediate category of scrutiny less apt to predetermine a 
statute's fate. This answered some of the criticisms of the old two-tier sys-
tem, but it has left privacy law even more befogged than before. The Court 
only intensified these perplexities in Cruzan, for there the Court seemed to 
abandon the language of fundamental rights to adopt the language of "liberty 
interests." The Court then "balanced" the liberty interest against "the rele-
vant state interests."16 Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed Cruzan had a 
fundamental right but not on how to evaluate the state interest. Justice 
Brennan said that "if a requirement imposed by a State 'significantly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it 
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to 
effectuate only those interests."' 17 Justice Stevens said that, at a minimum, 
the statute must "bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state end. "18 
Is this chaos of thought and passion, all confused, merely the product of 
an early stage in privacy jurisprudence? Perhaps, but there are reasons to 
think the pattern of undefined terms, multiple tests, and manipulable stan-
dards will persist. The problems with which the Court is struggling are bit-
terly difficult. Autonomy is a core value, but it is so endlessly expansive and 
has such different costs and benefits in different situations that writing prin-
ciples to promote it seems to baffle everyone. Furthermore, building doctrine 
by committee is awkward, particularly where the committee membership 
changes and the members are fractious and apparently unburdened by any 
sense of obligation to compromise even enough to provide guidance to lower 
courts, the bar, and the public. In both Cruzan and Glucksberg, for example, 
Justice O'Connor was part of a five-person majority but wrote concurring 
opinions that cast doubt on the majority's reasoning. And in Glucksberg the 
nine Justices wrote six opinions. Furthermore, the Court constructs consti-
tutional doctrine through a common law process that looks at issues piece-
meal. This makes it hard for the Court to assess any doctrine as a whole. 
As we will see throughout this chapter, this brief summary hardly does 
justice to the problems the Court has encountered in stating a defensible au-
tonomy principle and operationalizing it with workable tests. Thus, so much 
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is left to the Justices' discretion that they must draw deeply on their own re-
sources. So how well suited to making sound public policy are those re-
sources? 
Little in the training or experience of most judges fits them to make bio-
medical policy. Law schools primarily teach students to analyze legal docu-
ments and doctrines, to derive principles from precedents, and to apply 
precedents to new cases. Despite decades of criticism, judicial opinions 
dominate the enterprise. Even statutes are assigned cautiously, resisted by 
students, and taught gingerly. Students rarely read the social science that 
public policy should consult and regularly leave law school without encoun-
tering a serious analysis of how a legal doctrine actually works. Unhappily, 
scholars do not write such analyses, law teachers are often uninterested in 
them, 19 and authors cannot squeeze them into casebooks. 
Legal practice hardly remedies these defects of legal training. Lawyers 
today, particularly elite lawyers, tend to specialize narrowly. And for most 
lawyers even a general practice is a narrow enterprise. Thus it is possible-
it is common-to be appointed to the bench without ever having adminis-
tered an organization, met a payroll, run a public program, stood for office, 
or served in a legislature. Judges' social experience is likely to be narrow as 
well. Most elite judges were born into, and all of them live among, the com-
fortable classes. As a multimillionaire jurist once lamented to me, "I'm al-
ways the poorest man in any room I'm in."20 
Once anointed, judges become genuine generalists, assigned to resolve 
a breathtaking range of problems. Legislators may specialize; judges cannot. 
Legislators serve on specialized committees with expert staffs. Judges have 
only a few "clerks" who have just graduated from law school, and they can-
not consult experts out of court. Some judges even try to limit their social 
contacts to preserve their dispassion. In their work they lead lives of quiet 
preparation. In sum, judges suffer the narrowness of the generalist. 
All this means judges often know little about the issues of public policy 
they must resolve and have little experience analyzing public policy issues in 
any but doctrinal terms. Yet the way courts acquire and analyze information 
does little to ameliorate this ignorance and inexperience. The only judge 
who participates in finding facts is the trial judge. But trial judges have little 
control over what facts are discovered, for it is primarily the lawyers' re-
sponsibility to investigate the relevant facts and to introduce them into evi-
dence. 
Yet trial lawyers suffer from the same impoverished training and expe-
rience judges do. They are specialists at litigation who must educate them-
selves about every new case. Furthermore, their allegiance is not to the 
truth, but to the client, so that they typically introduce only evidence favor-
able to their clients. The range of opinions and information the judge hears 
thus depends on who the clients are. If they do not represent the full range 
of interested parties-and they rarely do-relevant positions will go unex-
plored. (Hospices, for instance, were not litigants in Glucksberg.) All this is 
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troublesome enough when the question is only whether some fact occurred. 
It is crippling when the issue is whether some policy is wise. Such a question 
requires analyses of complex data that can essentially be introduced only 
through expert witnesses. In American litigation, these witnesses are ordi-
narily paid by the parties, and paid to be partisan. Finally, the quantity and 
quality of the information lawyers introduce depend on the (markedly vari-
able) competence of the lawyers and the wealth of their clients ( and on the 
rules of evidence). 
In American law, appellate judges depend on the information trial courts 
gather. Appellate judges may not make inquiries of their own and in any event 
have neither time nor taste for doing so. They primarily rely on the parties' 
briefs and perhaps a joint appendix that reprints a few slivers of the record. 
(Although judges are entitled to summon the whole record, they rarely do.) 
Other affected parties may submit amicus curiae briefs, although they need 
not and although judges rarely read them. No judge is polymath enough to be 
well informed on all the kinds of cases that come before a court. Courts, in 
other words, make social policy on the basis of "executive summaries." 
The result of all this is that appellate courts regularly fail to understand 
the nature of the institutions and practices for which they make rules, even 
when those institutions and practices are legal ones. Thus, one fascinating 
study of the way courts actually deal with criminals concluded that the 
Supreme Court's decisions "overlook (1) the nature of courts as formal or-
ganization; (2) the relationship that the lawyer-regular actually has with the 
court organization; and (3) the character of the lawyer-client relationship in 
the criminal court (the routine relationships, not those unusual ones that 
are described in 'heroic' terms in novels, movies, and TV)."21 As another 
commentator puts it, "American jurists of criminal law rarely study the real-
ity of the American criminal justice system but potter happily away in an 
Alice-in-Wonderland world where defendants with competent lawyers go on 
trial and argue strenuously about mens rea or the rules of evidence or the 
exact weight or implication of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. "22 
Once again, the contrast with legislators is illuminating. In a well-run 
legislature, bills are turned over to a specialized committee. Its expert staff 
prepares reports and interviews witnesses who represent a range of interests 
and views. At hearings, legislators may ask whatever questions they wish (or 
are prompted to ask by their staff). Legislators may also interrogate anyone 
they choose about the controversy. And legislators properly heed public de-
bates and are properly the subject of lobbying (which would be improper ex 
parte contact were a judge approached). 
For all the reasons I have described, then, systematic empirical informa-
tion rarely intrudes itself into the labors of appellate judges. Even when 
it does, however, courts all too often dismiss it. As David Faigman says in 
his extended study of the problem, "Historically, most constitutional fact-
finding depended on the Justices' best guess about the matter."23 Faigman 
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notes, for example, that the Court asked for research on whether excluding 
jurors who oppose the death penalty biases juries in favor of conviction. Nev-
ertheless, in Lockhart v McCree, the Court dismissed the consequent out-
pouring of research on the ground that it did not meet the Court's high stan-
dards of empirical verification, a dismissal Faigman attributes in considerable 
part to the Court's failure to understand how social science works.24 
Perhaps my point about the ability of courts to assimilate information 
may be made more concrete by being made more personal: 
In the Chambers of the justice for whom I clerked, the burden of the 
Court's work meant that cases were handled like this: The justice 
would read the parties' briefs in each case; the three clerks divided the 
argued cases among them. Before oral argument, the clerks and the 
justice would discuss the cases. The justice would listen to the oral ar-
guments, and the Court would deliberate and vote privately. If my jus-
tice was assigned to write the opinion, the clerk who had worked on 
the case would draft it. He had ten days in which to do so. In that 
time, he continued to read briefs and to write memoranda to the jus-
tice on the petitions to hear cases that kept pouring into the Court. 
When the clerk was finished drafting the opinion, the justice would 
read it over and edit it lightly.25 
In this section, I have been asking whether there are a priori reasons to 
think judges will make good biomedical policy. I have suggested that the 
Constitution is not a rich source of relevant wisdom, that the Court has not 
developed constitutional doctrine that provides a cogent and workable ana-
lytic framework, that little in the training and experience of judges suits 
them to make public policy, and that courts are poorly organized to collect 
the kind of information and analysis on which successful policy ordinarily 
rests. In short, there are excellent reasons to doubt courts will make good 
bioethical policy through constitutional adjudication. 
Policy Analysis and the State Interests: 
The Example of Compassion in Dying 
I now want to look at one ambitious judicial attempt to make bioethical pol-
icy through constitutional adjudication to see how well courts actually suc-
ceed at it: by their fruits ye shall know them. My example, of course, is the 
Ninth Circuit's en bane opinion in Compassion in Dying v Washington. 26 
For brevity's sake, I will ignore the court's arguments about whether Wash-
ington's statute infringed some constitutional interest and concentrate on 
the court's analysis of the interests the state advanced to justify its statute. I 
will do so because the arguments deriving such a right have already been 
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lengthily criticized while the state-interest arguments have generally been 
scanted and because the court's treatment of the state's interests exempli-
fies the judicial incapacities I have been discussing.27 
In this part, I make two central arguments. The first is that courts typi-
cally fail to take states' interests seriously enough.28 My second central argu-
ment is that courts often are poorly informed about the policies they are 
making. The Ninth Circuit analyzed Compassion in Dying at uncommon 
length. Yet it repeatedly seems to have misunderstood the facts and argu-
ments basic to its decision. To demonstrate this, I will examine the court's 
treatment of each of the state's principal interests. 
The First State Interest: The Unqualified Interest 
in Life 
The Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging what the Supreme Court said in 
Cruzan: "The state may assert an unqualified interest in preserving life in 
general. "29 The court rejected this interest for two reasons. Its first reason 
was one that it returned to at several points and that was also the basis for 
the Second Circuit's decision in Quill v Vacco: 30 
[T]he state of Washington has already decided that its interest in pre-
serving life should ordinarily give way-at least in the case of compe-
tent, terminally ill adults who are dependent on medical treatment-to 
the wishes of the patients. In its Natural Death Act, ... Washington 
permits adults to have "life-sustaining treatment withheld or with-
drawn in instances of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious-
ness. "31 
The first problem with this argument is that Washington need not have 
"decided" its interest in life should give way. Rather, it might only have con-
cluded that the principle of Cruzan compelled it to permit people to refuse 
medical treatment. In other words, the state may have believed people are 
constitutionally entitled to resist bodily intrusions, even if those intrusions 
are livesaving. But the state might still have retained an interest in preserv-
ing life that it wished to assert in any permissible way. 
The second problem with the court's argument lies in its view of doc-
tors' motives: "In disconnecting a respirator, ... a doctor is unquestionably 
committing an act; he is taking an active role in bringing about the patient's 
death. In fact, there can be no doubt that in such instances the doctor in-
tends that, as the result of his action, the patient will die an earlier death 
than he otherwise would."32 The court is-characteristically-confident, but 
it is wrong. The doctor need not intend anything of the kind, often will in-
tend nothing of the kind, knows that predictions about disconnecting respi-
rators are perilous (as the case of Karen Ann Quinlan famously demon-
strated), and may hope the patient will survive. Nor is it obvious that 
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patients-who often cling to the wispiest hopes-want to die when they re-
fuse treatment. 
The court thought it was "not possible to distinguish prohibited from 
permissible medical conduct" in a second way: "[D]octors have been supply-
ing the causal agent of patients' death for decades. Physicians routinely and 
openly provide medication to terminally ill patients with the knowledge that 
it will have a 'double effect."'33 The doctrine of double effect is the principle 
"that a single act having two foreseen effects, one good and one harmful 
(such as death), is not always morally prohibited if the harmful effect is not 
intended. "34 The doctrine is commonly invoked to justify providing medica-
tion to relieve pain even though the medication is also likely to cause death 
as long as "the physician's provision of medication ... [is] intended to relieve 
grave pain and suffering and [is] not intended to hasten death."35 
The Ninth Circuit surely was not required to accept the doctrine of dou-
ble effect. But it was required to understand it and the consequences of re-
jecting it. Nevertheless, the court rushed headlong from the possibility that 
a doctor's action may cause death to the certainty that death must be the 
doctor's goal: "To us, what matters most is that the death of the patient is the 
intended result as surely in one case as in the other."36 The court does not 
seem to grasp that a doctor may know death is a risk without being certain it 
will happen or wanting it to. The court's misunderstanding may flow partly 
from its medical naivete. As one physician (and proponent of assisted sui-
cide) writes, "[C]aregivers experienced in hospice settings know that it is ex-
tremely difficult to produce a fatal overdose by increasing the amount of opi-
oid administered to a patient suffering pain. This is especially true when the 
agent is titrated with care and when the patient has been receiving an opioid 
long enough to build up tolerance."37 
Not only does the court misperceive the motives doctors and patients 
must have in terminating medical treatment or in seeking relief from pain, 
it seems not to have considered the consequences of equating those acts 
with suicide. If any refusal of treatment that might prolong life is suicide, a 
person or state that opposes suicide must undergo or demand extremes of 
treatment no one would think sensible. And if pain relief that runs some risk 
of causing death were called murder, how many doctors would treat pain ad-
equately? No wonder an observer as sober and serious as John Arras calls the 
court's rejection of the doctrine of double effect "reckless and counterpro-
ductive." He explains, "[M]any physicians would sooner give up their alle-
giance to adequate pain control than their opposition to assisted suicide and 
euthanasia. If they are convinced by the judge's reasoning, many will be re-
luctant to practice adequate pain control techniques on their dying pa-
tients. "38 
The court also depreciated the state's general interest in life because 
that interest "is dramatically diminished if the person it seeks to protect is 
terminally ill or permanently comatose and has expressed a wish that he be 
permitted to die without further medical treatment. ... "39 But the court 
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failed to explain satisfactorily why the state's interest is diminished by some-
one's decision to die, and the Supreme Court did not agree that it is: "As we 
have previously affirmed, the States 'may properly decline to make judg-
ments about the "quality" of life that a particular individual may 
enjoy ... ' .... This remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for those who 
are near death. "40 
The court acknowledged that the state might be deterred from permit-
ting assisted suicide by the difficulty of defining "terminally ill." However, 
the court so confidently assumed a workable definition is easily devised: 
We acknowledge that it is sometimes impossible to predict with cer-
tainty the duration of a terminally ill patient's remaining existence, 
just as it is sometimes impossible to say for certain whether a border-
line individual is or is not mentally competent. However, we believe 
that sufficient safeguards can and will be developed by the state and 
medical profession ... to ensure that the possibility of error will ordi-
narily be remote.41 
This implies that the problem is that doctors may apply the definition ofter-
minally ill inaccurately. That is certainly a concern, given the relentless un-
certainty of medical predictions and the notorious variability of medical 
practice. But the problem lies not just in applying the definition-it lies in 
devising it. The court scoffs at the "purported definitional difficulties" on the 
grounds that they "have repeatedly been surmounted."42 The court's evi-
dence is that states have enacted definitions of "terminal" into law. But that 
is no answer if the definitions are bad ones. Unfortunately, there is a reason 
to doubt the present state of knowledge permits reliable definition. One well-
informed study reports that 
every criterion has very serious problems and complexities, even in a 
population for whom good models for predicting survival is available. 
The number of long-term survivors increases when more inclusive cri-
teria are applied while the number of very early deaths increases when 
more restrictive criteria are used. No statistical criterion seems to cap-
ture only the population which was really intended.43 
Thus this study concluded, "Deciding who should be counted 'terminally ill' 
will pose such severe difficulties that it seems untenable as a criterion for 
permitting physician-assisted suicide. Allowing physicians (or anyone else) 
to decide who is terminally ill without standards or guidance will result in 
uneven application with unjustified variations across diseases, across physi-
cians, and across regions. "44 In short, the Ninth Circuit seems to have been 
unaware of the evidence that "[h ]ighly accurate predictive models of survival 
are difficult to create, harder to apply, scanty in number, flawed in practice, 
and impossible in theory."45 
Making Biomedical Policy through Constitutional Adjudication · 175 
The Second State Interest: 
Preventing Erroneous Decisions 
The Ninth Circuit conceded that "the state has a clear interest in prevent-
ing anyone, no matter what age, from taking his own life in a fit of despera-
tion, depression, or loneliness or as a result of any other problem, physical or 
psychological, which can be significantly ameliorated."46 However, the court 
said that "that interest ... is substantially diminished in the case of termi-
nally ill, competent adults who wish to die. "47 Here the Ninth Circuit appar-
ently misunderstood both the state's argument and the world of the dying. 
The court seemed to think the state was simply trying to prevent suicide. But 
the state was arguing that a decision to commit suicide made under the in-
fluence of mind-warping pressures is not autonomous.48 In other words, the 
state interest at issue was not a general interest in preventing suicide, but a 
more particular interest in preventing suicides that result from "decision de-
fects."49 
Although its opinion turns on the principle of autonomy, the court is 
largely indifferent to the problem of decision defects. Yet that problem is se-
vere for all patients and crucial for terminally ill patients contemplating sui-
cide. Thus Herbert Hendin, a leading student of suicide, writes, "Llke other 
suicidal individuals, patients who desire an early death during a serious or 
terminal illness are usually suffering from a treatable mental illness; most 
commonly a depressive condition or alcoholism. "50 Depression is notoriously 
unrecognized by its sufferers and those around them, particularly when, as 
for the dying, it is easy to identify a reason for sorrow. Worse, "depression is 
underdiagnosed and often inadequately treated. Although most people who 
kill themselves are under medical care at the time of death, their physicians 
often fail to recognize the symptoms of depressive illness or to provide ade-
quate treatment for the illness."51 
More broadly, the court seems afflicted with a naive view of human mo-
tivation, one that does not appreciate how complex, ambiguous, and am-
bivalent people's motives commonly are. The motives of the seriously ill have 
all those characteristics and are further roiled by the fatigue, fear, pressures, 
and disorientation disease wreaks on its sufferers.52 All these problems are 
exacerbated by the confrontation with mortality. Thus Hendin writes, "Clin-
icians and researchers working with patients who request assisted suicide 
during an illness have described the patients as having the same intense 
emotions, such as hopelessness, despair, anxiety, rage and guilt, seen in sui-
cidal patients without physical illness."53 These emotions conduce to ill-
considered decisions. Thus Stengel comments that many "suicidal attempts 
and quite a few suicides are carried out in the mood 'I don't care whether I 
live or die,' rather than with a clear and unambiguous determination to end 
life .... Most people, in committing a suicidal act, are just as muddled as 
they are whenever they do anything of importance under emotional 
stress."54 
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In addition, requests for suicide may be motivated by desires that can be 
less harshly satisfied. Hendin, for instance, suggests that losing their sense 
of control drives some patients to try to fix the time and circumstances of 
their deaths.55 If so, providing them with other kinds of power may satisfy 
their wish for control.56 Similarly, Hendin reports, "The vast majority of pa-
tients who request assisted suicide or euthanasia are motivated primarily by 
the dread of what will happen to them in the dying process rather than by 
their current pain or suffering .... When these fears are dealt with by a car-
ing, sensitive physician, the patient's requests for death usually disappear."57 
Hendin also believes patients requesting help committing suicide, "like 
other suicidal individuals, are often testing the affection and care of others. 
The overwhelming number of patients drop the request to die, however, if 
their anxieties are dealt with sensitively and effectively."58 
If these are the kinds of reasons patients request help committing sui-
cide, it is unsurprising that the "desire for death is variable over time even 
for patients who are terminally ill. This is true even among the small num-
ber of terminally ill patients expressing a persistent wish to die. When inter-
viewed two weeks later, two-thirds of these patients show a significant de-
crease in the extent of the desire to die."59 It is commonly observed that, 
"once patients are confronted with illness, continued life often becomes 
more precious; given access to appropriate relief from pain and other debil-
itating symptoms, many of those who consider suicide during the course of 
a terminal illness abandon their desire for a quicker death in favor of a 
longer life made more tolerable with effective treatment. "60 Such changes of 
heart are experienced by patients of all kinds, not just the dying. For exam-
ple, one patient-Wilfrid Sheed-learned that "cancer, even more than 
polio, has a disarming way of bargaining downward, beginning with your 
whole estate and then letting you keep the game warden's cottage or the 
badminton court; and by the time it has tried to frighten you to death and 
threatened to take away your very existence, you'd be amazed at how little 
you're willing to settle for."61 
In sum, there is much evidence that a disturbing number of terminally 
ill patients considering suicide are not making truly autonomous decisions. 
Depression is a predominant motive for seeking assistance in suicide even 
among the terminally ill. It is generally treatable, but it is often not diagnosed 
by doctors. People seeking suicide are often in the grip of emotions they do 
not understand and are pursuing goals that can be met in less drastic ways. 
The wish to commit suicide is often inconstant. In short, decision defects 
plague decisions to die. Perhaps all this evidence is not incontrovertible. But 
it is the kind of evidence a state might reasonably adduce to support the in-
terests it advances. Just such evidence in fact influenced the New York State 
Task Force on Llfe and the Law to recommend that assisted suicide not be 
legally permitted.62 
Had the court accorded this evidence the respect it warranted, the 
court would not just have taken the decision-defects argument more seri-
ously. It might also have understood how challenging the state's argument 
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was to the court's view of the case. For the state was not just invoking a pa-
ternalistic interest in protecting its citizens. Rather, it was asserting an in-
terest in promoting its citizens' autonomy, in protecting people from being 
led into making decisions that are not autonomous. In its strongest form, the 
state's argument was that on balance prohibiting assisted suicide serves au-
tonomy better than permitting it. This would be true if-put crudely-more 
people would be kept by the prohibition from nonautonomously committing 
suicide than would autonomously decide to commit suicide were it legal. In 
short, the court's crucial premise-that the choice was between autonomy 
and paternalism-was wrong. Rather, the choice was between two views of 
how to promote autonomous decisions. 
But why was the court-which elsewhere in its opinion was shocked at 
any interference with autonomy-so indifferent to the state's arguments on 
behalf ofit? While the court acknowledged that "many suicides are commit-
ted by people who are suffering from treatable mental disorders,"63 it implied 
that suicides by the terminally ill are different: "In the case of a terminally ill 
adult who ends his life in the final stages of an incurable and painful degen-
erative disease, in order to avoid debilitating pain and a humiliating death, 
the decision to commit suicide is not senseless .... "64 And the court said that 
should an error "in medical or legal judgment" occur (a possibility the court 
thought "remote"65), it would be "likely to benefit the individual by permit-
ting a victim of unmanageable pain and suffering to end his life peacefully 
and with dignity at the time he deems most desirable."66 Apparently, then, 
the court thought suicide the rational response to terminal illness. 
The court, in other words, appears to espouse the view I suspect many 
people credit-that suicide is a normal response to terminal illness and that 
the terminally ill who want to commit suicide thus differ sharply from other 
suicidal people. This may be a common view, but there is good reason to 
doubt it (particularly if you do not assume, as the court seems to, that every 
terminally ill person who wants to commit suicide is in unbearable, untreat-
able pain). As I have been suggesting, even terminally ill people who con-
sider suicide often change their minds when some of their other problems 
are ameliorated. And "only a small percentage of terminally ill or severely ill 
patients attempt or commit suicide."67 
But even if suicide were the rational response to terminal illness, it 
would still be surprising that the court could be so unconcerned about deci-
sion defects. A standard argument for patient's autonomy is exactly that peo-
ple's views of rationality differ, and that each person's view should be re-
spected. ls, then, the court concerned for autonomy, or is it animated by a 
view of how the dying should act?68 
The Third State Interest: Preventing Undue Influence 
The third state interest the Ninth Circuit acknowledged was protecting the 
dying from arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence. The court dismissed the 
possibility of two kinds of danger. First, it jeered at the argument that pro-
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hibiting assisted suicide is necessary "to protect the disadvantaged."69 The 
court, however, hardly bothered to explain why that argument is "disingen-
uous," "fallacious," and "meretricious," and it rushed on to say "there is far 
more reason to raise the opposite concern-that the poor would be denied 
'the assistance that would allow them to end their lives with a measure of 
dignity."'70 The court expressed itself obscurely, but it apparently reasoned 
that assisted suicide is a medical service, that the poor get fewer medical 
services than the rich, and that therefore the poor will have less access 
to help in committing suicide. The state's argument, however, was that 
those caring for the poor will be too ready to acquiesce in their suicide be-
cause (a) they regard the lives of the poor as less valuable than other lives 
and (b) helping the poor die is cheaper than keeping them alive. The court 
never grapples with (a) and seems never to grasp (b). 
The court did admit there is reason to worry "that infirm, elderly per-
sons will come under undue pressure to end their lives from callous, finan-
cially burdened, or self-interested relatives, or others who have influence 
over them."71 The court said it did "not minimize the concern."72 Perhaps 
not, but neither did it evince much understanding of it. The concern, of 
course, is that debilitated and desperate people are suggestible: "[D]emoral-
ization and lack of assertiveness are likely to make the terminally ill patient 
more vulnerable to the suggestions of others .... "73 The primary point is not 
(as the court implies) that patients will be hustled off by hard-hearted or 
grasping doctors and relatives. It is more centrally that "[w]ell-meaning and 
discreet suggestions, or even unconscious changes in expression, gesture, 
and tone of voice, can move a dependent and suggestible patient toward a 
choice for death."74 It is that families-wearied financially, psychologically, 
and morally by the trials of caring for someone gravely ill-might yearn for 
the patient to ease them of their burden. In this light, it is disturbing that, ac-
cording to one study of the Dutch experience "more euthanasia requests 
came from the families of patients than the patients themselves. The inves-
tigator for the study concluded that the families, the doctors and the nurses 
were involved in pressuring the patients to request euthanasia. "75 
This is troubling, of course, on autonomy grounds. The rationale for a 
right to assisted suicide is deference to the patient's choice, but that ration-
ale is defeated where the patient was pressured into committing suicide. But 
it is troubling on another ground as well, for families' distress can sometimes 
be satisfied less drastically: "A 1989 Swedish study revealed that when 
chronically ill patients attempted suicide, their overburdened families often 
did not want them resuscitated. When social services stepped in and re-
lieved the family's burden by sending in home care helpers, most patients 
wanted to live and their families wanted them to live as well. "76 
The changing structure of American medical care provides additional 
reason to worry about pressures to choose death. American health care is 
being transformed by the rise of managed care and cost containment. We 
are thus moving from a system in which it was generally in doctors' financial 
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interest to overtreat patients toward one in which doctors have incentives to 
undertreat them. Both systems have their failings, and it is hardly obvious 
that the old system was better for patients.77 But any decision to permit as-
sisted suicide needs to consider that the new system gives doctors direct fi-
nancial reasons to persuade their patients to die.78 Once again, however, the 
Ninth Circuit was either ignorant or indifferent. 
The Ninth Circuit did, however, have another string to its bow. Its prin-
cipal response to concerns that people might be pressured into committing 
suicide, as to concerns about whether patients might commit suicide im-
providently, was that doctors will regulate these decisions. So crucial is this 
argument that it deserves quoting at length: 
We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally ill 
patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable chance 
of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live under toler-
able conditions. We also believe that physicians would not assist a pa-
tient to end his life if there were any significant doubt about the pa-
tient's true wishes. To do so would be contrary to the physicians' 
fundamental training, their conservative nature, and the ethics of their 
profession. In any case, since doctors are highly-regulated profession-
als, it should not be difficult for the state or the profession itself to es-
tablish rules and procedures that will ensure that the occasional negli-
gent or careless recommendation by a licensed physician will not result 
in an uninformed or erroneous decision by the patient or his family.79 
It is hard to know where to start analyzing this astonishing statement. 
Perhaps we may begin by observing that the court does not trouble to provide 
evidence for it.80 But evidence is acutely needed, for the court's propositions 
are, at best, suspect. Even the court's colorable assumption that doctors are 
"highly-regulated professionals" is dubious. Doctors certainly feel tightly reg-
ulated, and bitterly many of them resent it.81 When doctors talk of assisted 
suicide, they often assert some kind of entitlement to do what they believe is 
best for their patients and are incredulous when told the law might claim to 
influence their judgment. But is medicine "highly regulated"? The very def-
inition of a profession is that it is crucially self-regulating, and few profes-
sions have been as concerned to preserve that prerogative or as triumphant 
in doing so as medicine. 82 Law is ordinarily tamely respectful of that prerog-
ative. 83 When it regulates medicine-medical malpractice doctrine is a cru-
cial example-it generally accepts medicine's own standards. Even where 
the law has powerful reasons to regulate-for example, when disciplining in-
competent doctors-it is notoriously feeble. Courts have been particularly 
loath to be saddled with decisions at the end of life and have preferred to set 
broad standards rather than adjudicate individual cases. 
The Ninth Circuit's assumption that doctors are highly regulated is es-
pecially odd in an area where doctors have so flagrantly violated the law with 
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such impunity. When Timothy Quill admitted in a preeminent medical jour-
nal that he had helped a patient commit suicide, he was investigated but 
not prosecuted.84 A few miles down the road from where I write, Jack 
Kevorkian's toll has now passed one hundred. He was thrice prosecuted for 
assisting with suicides but never convicted.85 Only when he delivered a tape 
of himself in flagrante delicto to 60 Minutes and stripped himself of legal 
counsel was he convicted of murder. Oh law, where is thy sting? 
The Ninth Circuit might have recalled that the law's enforcement prob-
lem is old and ubiquitous, that people do not obey just because the law com-
mands. 86 The enforcement problem is harshest in cases like those involving 
medical decisions-where an activity occurs in private, where the people the 
law wants to influence feel the decision is theirs to make,87 where the only 
person keeping records is the person regulated, and where the victim is dead 
and cannot complain.88 
The Ninth Circuit explains its sang-froid about improvident decisions 
to commit suicide partly by saying concern about undue influence "is ame-
liorated in large measure because of the mandatory involvement in the 
decision-making process of physicians, who have a strong bias in favor of 
preserving life .... "89 Here the court appears to accept an increasingly out-
moded version of doctors' attitudes toward treating the dying. It was long re-
gretted that doctors would strive officiously to keep patients alive. But this 
criticism is becoming anachronistic. More and more it is doctors who start 
discussions of stopping treatment, and understandably.90 Horribly ill people 
who cannot improve are rarely rewarding patients. And the treatments that 
keep them alive often distress all concerned. 
But the court need not have rested its decision on how much doctors 
are regulated or how resolutely they wish to keep patients alive, for there are 
many concrete factors it could have consulted and much evidence it might 
have evaluated. The court professed to be "aware of the concern that doctors 
become hardened to the inevitability of death and to the plight of terminally 
ill patients, and that they will treat requests to die in a routine and imper-
sonal manner, rather than affording the careful, thorough, individualized at-
tention that each request deserves. "91 But those concerns are much more 
specific and troubling even than this. What the court asks of doctors is more 
challenging than the court realizes. For example, "the detection ofjudgment-
impairing confusion among dying people is surprisingly difficult .... [O]ne 
researcher concluded that 'our clinical observations miss profound confu-
sional episodes in [20%] of our patients."'92 Not only do "physicians and 
nurses regularly overstate dying patients' decision-making competence," but 
there is currently "inadequate experience or research data to design reliable 
safeguards to ensure the lucidity of dying patients who might claim a right to 
assisted suicide. "93 
Bluntly phrased, the question the court should have asked was this: If 
doctors will supervise suicides so well, why do they so often treat the dying 
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so badly? As Howard Brody writes, "It has been exhaustively documented 
that medical management of terminal suffering is currently inadequate."94 
Indeed, he says there is "compelling evidence that the status quo is far below 
optimal, if not actually scandalous. "95 More specifically, it is notorious that 
too many doctors are poorly trained to recognize depression, that they often 
undertreat pain, and communicate badly with patients. And most relevantly, 
who believes doctors do an exemplary job oflearning and heeding the wishes 
of dying patients? The Ninth Circuit 
apparently assumes that clinicians faithfully adhere to patients' wishes 
in treatment decisions, including end-of-life care. But there is disturb-
ing evidence that this is not so .... [In the] SUPPORT [study,] ... 
fewer than one-fourth of treating physicians had ever reviewed the pa-
tient's preferences, even when these were explicitly written down in 
an advance directive. Even when patients' preferences were known, 
they were frequently simply ignored. 96 
Doctors fail in the duties they already owe dying patients and seem fated 
to fail as guardians of patients' decisions to die for many-often understand-
able-reasons. Routine dulls sympathy, as Rousseau knew long ago: "When 
we have seen a sight it ceases to impress us, use is second nature, what is al-
ways before our eyes no longer appeals to the imagination, and it is only 
through the imagination that we can feel the sorrows of others; this is why 
priests and doctors who are always beholding death and suffering become so 
hardened. "97 The frustrations and irritations of unresponsive and unreward-
ing patients can defeat even dedicated doctors, for "physicians do in fact get 
tired of treating patients who are hard to cure, who resist their best efforts, 
who are on their way down-especially when they have had no long-term re-
lationship with them over many years. 'Gorks,' 'gamers,' and 'vegetables' are 
only some of the less-than-affectionate names such patients receive from 
the interns and residents."98 Finally, the delicate decisions the Ninth Circuit 
wants from doctors are especially elusive when doctors are intensely busy-
as many chronically are. 
Hardening of sympathies is an unavoidable problem even under good 
circumstances. But what happens when suicide becomes a right doctors are 
commanded to respect? The court expects doctors to find the elusive line 
between honoring the patient's "right to die" and ensuring patients do not 
make "unfree" decisions. But the lessons of reform are rarely learned in 
such subtle ways. As I once wrote, "People can usually follow the letter of a 
new rule, but its spirit is harder to capture."99 Many doctors learn only crude 
lessons from bioethics-tell patients the truth (always); accede to patient's 
decisions to withdraw treatment (always). Doctors who have so long been 
castigated for their paternalism thus seem likely to err on the side of defer-
ring to assertions of the right to die. The court expects doctors to spot defec-
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tive decisions because suicide now seems so heterodox. But as it became 
routine and blessed by the authority of a constitutional right it would become 
normal and would evoke less anxiety and scrutiny. 
Even the most sensitive doctor may be perplexed at the task of supervi-
sion the court blithely imposes. For how should a doctor answer when a pa-
tient asks for help committing suicide? How hard, if at all, should a doctor 
try to dissuade the patient? Is dissuasion an improper attempt to manipulate 
what should be an autonomous decision? A way of helping patients evaluate 
their situation more intensely and thus of enhancing patients' autonomy? Or 
is it a way of making sure the patient's decision is free, informed, and irrev-
ocable? And when, if at all, should a doctor propose, or even mention, as-
sisted suicide?100 Is proposing it a duty commanded by the doctrine of in-
formed consent every time the patient is eligible for it? Is any mention of it 
inherently a suggestion? What implications would that suggestion have? 
That the patient's life is not worth living? That the patient is a burden? That 
the case is hopeless? That the doctor wants to give up? Should the burden 
always be on the patient to make the first suggestion? 
The court's faith that doctors will prevent improvident or pressured de-
cisions to commit suicide ignores yet another problem. Any time the medical 
profession is made the gatekeeper to something people want and feel enti-
tled to (abortions, draft deferments, letters verifying an employee's disabil-
ity) a few doctors will be driven by ideology or economics to provide it, often 
uncritically and even zealously. Only a few such doctors are needed to make 
the service widely available. Jack Kevorkian is a gruesome example, but 
Hendin observes, "Although Kevorkian may seem eccentric, it is worth 
knowing that in the Netherlands, a small number of physicians are attracted 
to euthanasia and do a great number of cases."101 
This brings us to our most direct evidence about how well doctors might 
supervise assisted suicide-Holland. As Hendin notes, "The Dutch model 
and Dutch guidelines have been accepted as models for the Oregon law and 
most of the state laws being considered in this country to legalize assisted 
suicide and euthanasia."102 Reliable information about the Dutch experi-
ment is elusive, and interpretations ofit differ. Nevertheless, there is reason 
to fear that Dutch doctors regulate these decisions poorly, that "[v]irtually 
every guideline established by the Dutch, whether it be a voluntary, well-
considered, persistent request; intolerable suffering that cannot be relieved; 
consultation; or the reporting of cases, has failed to protect patients or has 
been modified or violated with impunity."103 
One homely test of the doctor's role as supervisor of suicide comes from 
a model case of assisted suicide-the story of how Timothy Quill helped his 
patient "Diane" to die. 104 Quill is a prominent exponent of assisted suicide 
(indeed, he is the Quill of Quill v Vacca). His account of Diane's story has 
widely been thought to exemplify what laudable medical care would be like 
were assisted suicide legal. That account describes a sorrowful physician 
yielding to his patient's exercise of her autonomy. Yet in a penetrating and 
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disturbing study of that account, Patricia Wesley shows in some detail how 
dubious it is. She concludes that "[f]ar from being the neutral reflector and 
facilitator of Diane's desires that he believes himself to be, Dr. Quill in fact 
powerfully and directly shapes those desires."105 
I have been suggesting that one reason the Ninth Circuit was confident 
doctors could safeguard decisions to commit suicide is that it did not under-
stand what it was asking doctors to do or how they would react. There may 
be another reason-the court did not have to write the regulations for the 
new regime. Instead, it could airily say, "Any of several model statutes might 
serve as an example of how these legitimate and important concerns can be 
addressed effectively."106 Perhaps it is only when an institution must actually 
develop (and administer?) regulations that it realizes their perplexities. The 
Ninth Circuit could spare itself that burden and hence the trouble of clearer, 
harder thought. 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit would make doctors the guardians of the de-
cision to commit suicide. Why, then, did it not ask the old question, Quis cus-
todiet ipsos custodes? We ask that question not because the guardians are 
untrustworthy (although some will be), but because we recognize the diffi-
culty of their job. It is that difficulty with which the court declines to grapple. 
The Fourth State Interest: Protecting the Integrity 
of the Medical Profession 
The Ninth Circuit did "not believe that the integrity of the medical profes-
sion would be threatened in any way by the vindication of the liberty interest 
at issue here." On the contrary, "it is the existence of a statute that crimi-
nalizes the provision of medical assistance to patients in need that could cre-
ate conflicts with the doctors' professional obligations and make covert crim-
inals out of honorable, dedicated, and compassionate individuals."107 The 
court reasoned, "The assertion that the legalization of physician-assisted sui-
cide will erode the commitment of doctors to help their patients rests both 
on an ignorance of what numbers of doctors have been doing for a consider-
able time and on a misunderstanding of the proper function of a physi-
cian. "!Os 
The court's reference to what doctors are already doing is a restatement 
of the court's belief that doctors are helping patients commit suicide (are 
killing patients?) when they withdraw treatment needed to prolong life. I 
have already criticized this argument, so we need now say only that this is 
not what doctors or patients understand doctors to be doing and that those 
understandings speak to the state's argument about the integrity of the med-
ical profession. For the state's argument is that doctors who think they are 
assisting in their patients' suicide will regard those patients differently from 
doctors who believe they would never do so and that patients who believe 
their doctors would never assist in their suicide can trust their doctors more 
freely than patients who are denied that confidence. 
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The court's explanation of "the proper function of a physician" is ob-
scure. Perhaps most mystifying is its statement that "experience shows that 
most doctors can readily adapt to a changing legal climate. Once the Court 
held that a woman has a constitutional right to have an abortion, doctors 
began performing abortions routinely and the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession remained undiminished."109 This is mystifying on two levels. 
First, not everyone would agree that the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession is undiminished. Kass and Lund, for example, see 
good reasons to argue the contrary. Massive numbers of abortions are 
now being performed, far beyond what was originally expected, and for 
reasons not originally regarded as appropriate. Moreover, physician ac-
ceptance of abortion may in fact be partly responsible for recent weak-
enings in the professions's repugnance to cause death .... [O]ne of the 
arguments offered twenty-five years ago against allowing doctors to 
perform abortions was that it would inevitably lead to doctors perform-
ing euthanasia. 110 
Second, the question is not whether doctors will "adapt to a changing legal 
climate." It is whether that changing climate will be regrettable. First, how 
will patients regard doctors with a license to kill? Ours is an age of distrust. 
It is also an age when we must trust even strangers. As medical care is bu-
reaucratized, our doctors become such strangers, strangers to whom we 
confide our health and even our lives. In these circumstances, one assur-
ance patients may value is the knowledge that doctors will not, cannot, kill. 
The justice of these fears is suggested by a second concern-that doc-
tors may be disquieted and even corrupted by the power and practice of eu-
thanasia. The Ninth Circuit was sanguine about the effect of assisted suicide 
on the profession because doctors already participate in their patients' 
deaths. But this is all the more reason for concern. Conscientious doctors 
worry deeply about their power, about how it hardens and distances them, 
about their own motives; bioethicists have warned for years about the arro-
gance of power. Assisted suicide would inflame such concerns: "One physi-
cian who has worked for many years in a hospice caring for dying patients 
put the matter most convincingly: 'Only because I knew that I could not and 
would not kill my patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately into 
caring for them as they lay dying."'lll And in this light it is troubling to read 
Hendin's report: 
A number of Dutch euthanasia advocates have admitted that practic-
ing euthanasia with legal sanction has encouraged doctors to feel that 
they can make life or death decisions without consulting patients. 
Dutch euthanasia practitioners ask themselves the following question: 
Would I want to live if I were the patient? The question not only im-
plies that a physician has a right to make decisions about whose life is 
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worth living, it also ignores considerable research that has shown that 
doctor's [sic] consistently underestimate patient perceptions as to their 
quality of life.112 
The Fifth State Interest: The Slippery Slope 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the state's slippery-slope argument-the 
argument that legalizing assisted suicide will lead down a spiral of unin-
tended consequences toward what the court invidiously refers to as "a pa-
rade of horribles."113 The court contemns this suggestion: "This same ni-
hilistic argument can be offered against any constitutionally-protected right 
or interest .... In fact, the Court has never refused to recognize a substan-
tive due process liberty right or interest merely because there were difficul-
ties in determining when and how to limit its exercise or because others 
might someday attempt to use it improperly. "114 It is hard to understand why 
the slippery-slope argument is "nihilistic." Nihilism is the belief that all ar-
guments are meaningless; people who invoke the slippery slope are saying 
that one argument is bad and that others are not. Nor is it a compliment to 
the Supreme Court to say it has been indifferent to slippery slopes. Part of 
making good policy is considering where a policy might lead and how it might 
be misused. In addition, concerns about slippery slopes have helped lead the 
Supreme Court to decline to announce a constitutional right. 115 In short, the 
Ninth Circuit should have asked whether legalizing assisted suicide would 
cause intolerable slippery-slope problems. That should have led it to exam-
ine the three kinds of slippery slopes. 
The first slope is the possibility that people who did not qualify for help 
with suicide would nevertheless receive it. This could happen in two princi-
pal ways. First, doctors might try but fail to distinguish between qualified and 
unqualified candidates. Second, doctors might not try to distinguish among 
candidates. This is a familiar process. Legislatures once attempted to permit 
only those abortions necessary to protect a woman's life or health. That line 
did not hold and in some places was breached almost overnight. Similarly, 
even judges in a state as Catholic as Massachusetts declined to make the in-
quiries the Supreme Court contemplated when it established rules in Bel-
lotti v Baird116 governing the ability of minors to obtain abortions.117 Llke-
wise, states long sought to make divorce available only on fault grounds, but 
judges widely flouted that rule. 118 
Llnes are fragile for many reasons. Not everyone will sympathize with a 
line, and some who dislike it will breach it. Even people who approve of a 
rule may find it easier to say yes than no or may find cases at the margin hard 
to manage. The process of deciding a series of cases tends to shift the line, 
since the most extreme case decided in the past tends to become the stan-
dard for the present. Furthermore, routine domesticates: a case that once 
seemed uncomfortable soon becomes too familiar to justify attention. The 
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regulations that sustain lines are particularly susceptible when they chal-
lenge a constitutional right, for such rights have so much moral force and 
usually evoke so much judicial solicitude that they are hard to resist. As John 
Arras remarks, "We have actually seen this script played out before in the 
context of abortion law .... One regulatory constraint that had been placed 
on women's choice in some jurisdictions was mandatory review by a hospital-
based committee .... [T]his regulatory mechanism, along with a host of oth-
ers, was unceremoniously discarded by the Supreme Court. ... "119 
In short, there are good reasons to wonder how durable any line limit-
ing assisted suicide would be. And there are special reasons to fear for the 
line limiting it to competent, terminally ill adults who have made a free and 
determined decision. These are the reasons we reviewed when we examined 
the difficulties of defining "terminally ill," of ascertaining whether a patient 
was competent to make a considered decision, of preventing patients from 
choosing suicide under undue influence, and of making doctors the guaran-
tors of regularity. To these excellent a priori reasons to doubt the line will 
hold we must add the evidence that in Holland-the only jurisdiction with 
real experience of such a line-it has been widely breached. 
The first slippery-slope problem, then, is that the rules governing assisted 
suicide might be applied unsoundly. The second slippery slope is the possibil-
ity that the principle the court employed to justify assisted suicide will be more 
capacious than is necessary to accord competent, terminally ill patients a right 
to the help of a doctor in committing suicide. 120 In other words, we must ask 
whether the principle of Compassion in Dying leads beyond that limit and 
would justify a constitutional right to voluntary euthanasia, or to nonvoluntary 
euthanasia, or even to involuntary euthanasia. The answer is all too likely to be 
yes. As Justice Holmes said, "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute 
to their logical extreme."121 And the Ninth Circuit recruits a notoriously 
"greedy"122 right, what is broadly if imprecisely called a right to "privacy," a 
right "whose core principle seems endlessly expansive."123 What is more, the 
Ninth Circuit interprets that right aggressively. For example, the court 
seemed to believe there is a fundamental right to make all "decisions that are 
highly personal and intimate, as well as of great importance to the individ-
ual,"124 and it invoked the Supreme Court's most rapturous flights of rheto-
ric-like the celebrated passage from Casey I quoted earlier. 
In sum, the second kind of slippery-slope argument suggests that the 
Ninth Circuit's principle was too strong. It is thus strange that the court says, 
"The question whether that type of physician conduct may be constitution-
ally prohibited must be answered directly in future cases, and not in this 
one."125 Courts may not decide cases not before them, but they should at 
least peer down the road to see what lies ahead. This, after all, is why the 
common law uses hypotheticals so lavishly-to accelerate the process of lit-
igation to test a principle's force and valence.126 
The third kind of slippery slope raises the possibility that as courts in-
terpret a new right, it will expand beyond its original justification. This pro-
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cess operates by small steps, often without judicial recognition that "rights 
creep" is occurring. It is easy to imagine ways the right to assisted suicide 
might slide down this slope. First, we would hear that anything that limits 
the right is improper. In the zeal to prevent that impropriety, the scope of 
the right itself would swell. Second, there would be equal protection argu-
ments that people not eligible for assisted suicide were just as deserving as 
those who were. 127 It would be said, for example, that there are only trivial 
differences between the seriously and the terminally ill, or between the 
physically ill and those suffering other kinds of miseries. It would be said that 
people who are terminally ill but unable to kill themselves should not be de-
nied a right other terminally ill people have. It would next be proposed that 
people who were terminally ill but not mentally competent should have the 
benefit of the right to commit suicide. If this seems far-fetched, one should 
recall that in Cruzan Justice Brennan argued that if Cruzan could not exer-
cise her "right to die" someone should exercise it for her. 128 
Justice Brennan's position in Cruzan and Justice Stevens's as well ex-
emplify how an idea can be unloosed from its moorings and slide in aston-
ishing directions. The "right to die" was born as an expression of au-
tonomism and antipaternalism. But that rationale could be transformed in a 
blink into paternalism itself. Justice Brennan, for example, wanted to trans-
mute Cruzan's right to make a decision for herself into her family's entitle-
ment to guess what her decision would have been had she made one. And 
Justice Stevens wanted to transmute Cruzan's right to make a decision into 
her family's entitlement to do what they thought would be best for her. 129 
These may be good policy choices, but not because Cruzan had an autonomy 
right. Stripped of their autonomy language, these two opinions represent ar-
guments for treating Cruzan benevolently, paternalistically .130 
One might respond to the state's slippery-slope arguments by saying 
that such arguments are logically dubious. If a first step is right, it is right 
even though the second step is wrong. If the second step is wrong, it simply 
should not be taken. But that should not prevent taking the first step, since 
there is no logical reason the second step must be taken just because the first 
one was. Indeed, there is a logical reason to stop before reaching the bottom, 
since the whole argument assumes that the top of the slope is crucially dif-
ferent from the bottom. 131 
Logically, this refutation of the slippery-slope argument seems convinc-
ing. But as Justice Holmes famously said, "The life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience." And the American experience of law at the 
end of life confirms the hazards of the slippery slope. This should not be sur-
prising. First, slippery slopes are dangerous whatever the logic because of 
the common law's method. The common law reasons from precedents. It 
asks whether each new case is essentially the same as some precedent. If so, 
it is decided in the same way. But if you decide a series of cases in the same 
way because each case is almost the same as its predecessor, the end of the 
series may wind up far distant from the beginning. 
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Second, slippery slopes operate psychologically, not logically. "[T]hey 
work partly by domesticating one idea and thus making its nearest neighbor 
down the slope seem less extreme and unthinkable."132 Yet a third reason we 
slide down slippery slopes is that people are pushing us. Some Americans ar-
dently want to change the law at the end of life. They well know that the pub-
lic is afraid of the bottom of the slope; they have consciously calculated how 
to move us down it by small steps. 
Experience justifies the state's slippery-slope arguments. Over the past 
few decades, the United States has moved from a reluctance even to with-
draw medical treatment to serious proposals for active euthanasia, with as-
surances all along the way that each step was the last. My colleague Yale 
Kamisar rightly asks, "If, as has been well said, 'the history of our activities 
and beliefs concerning the ethics of death and dying is a history of lost dis-
tinctions of former significance,' what reason is there to think that the his-
tory will end when we sanction assisted suicide for the terminally ill?"133 
Holland's experiment with assisted suicide suggests that the American slide 
would continue further than we might like: "Over the past two decades, 
Dutch law and Dutch medicine have evolved from accepting assisted suicide 
to accepting euthanasia, from euthanasia for terminally ill patients to eu-
thanasia for chronically ill individuals, from euthanasia for physical illness to 
euthanasia for psychological distress, and from voluntary euthanasia to the 
practice and conditional acceptance of nonvoluntary and involuntary eu-
thanasia. "134 The Ninth Circuit's opinion itself exemplifies the slippery-slope 
problem. That court says to Washington, you have slid thus far down the 
slope, therefore it would be unconstitutional not to go much further. That 
court refuses to consider just where the end of the slope might be. If the 
court could not look at our history, or Holland's, it could at least have looked 
to itself to see why it should not have dismissed the state's slippery-slope ar-
gument. 
On Collective State Interests 
The Ninth Circuit, I have been saying, had trouble with all the state's inter-
ests. However, it, like most courts, particularly scanted interests that do not 
operate in a direct and obvious way on individual people, but that affect peo-
ple collectively. Indeed, the court said: "If broad general state policies can be 
used to deprive a terminally ill individual of the right to make that choice, it 
is hard to envision where the exercise of arbitrary and intrusive power by the 
state can be halted."135 This is perverse. Broad and general policies often 
promote basic and genuine social interests. 136 
The Supreme Court does seem to recognize the importance of such in-
terests. It believes, for example, that states may have "an 'unqualified inter-
est in the preservation of human life,"' an interest which "is symbolic and as-
pirational as well as practical."137 Unfortunately, it is not clear what the 
Court means by a "symbolic and aspirational" interest or why it is important. 
Let me suggest one possibility. Sometimes law cannot achieve its goals 
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through direct regulations because effective law enforcement is not practi-
cable. Law has "expressive" resources that may then be recruited. Law's ex-
pressive function, that is, seeks "not so much to influence behavior by re-
quiring or forbidding people to perform a particular act, but to influence 
behavior by encouraging people to think in a particular way. "138 
Assisted-suicide statutes exemplify this expressive use of law. Killing 
cannot be prevented solely through regulation, for people are not always de-
terred simply by fear of punishment, particularly when they have lively mo-
tives for killing. Rather, they must be led to internalize a norm against killing. 
Given the forces opposing it, that norm must be exigent. The classic exam-
ple of a deeply internalized, exigent norm is a taboo. A taboo is a prohibition 
without exception, to which exceptions are unthinkable. Taboos work for 
that reason. As soon as they are subject to rational analysis, as soon as qual-
ifications and exceptions become permissible, their social, psychological, 
and perhaps even moral force begins to crumble: 
Taboos do not work rationally; they work by inducing reactions of hor-
ror and disgust at the prohibited practice. Rational analysis of taboos is 
not only likely to miss this point, but even itself to weaken the taboo. 
Once you begin to think[, for example,] about which kinds of incest-
like activities lack particular identifiable harmful consequences for 
particular identifiable participants, you begin to think about the un-
thinkable and about why some "incest" is harmless incest. As this pro-
cess continues, the emotional force of the taboo, its force as a general 
deterrent, is eroded. 139 
"Thou shalt not kill" is a core taboo. As we begin to consider when it is 
good deliberately to end a life without even the cloak of the justification that 
it is the disease that is causing the death or that the death is an inadvertent 
and undesired side effect of treating pain, the taboo against killing begins to 
erode. When we begin to say killing is a question of each individual's values, 
the erosion worsens. 
Recent developments have already troubled the borderland between life 
and death. For example, withdrawing medical treatment is today not only 
normal, it is becoming virtuous. The rise of abortion as a right has altered 
views about whether each abortion is some kind of killing. We have re-
defined death to suit our need for transplantable organs by adopting a brain-
death standard. We are beginning to contemplate using higher-brain death. 
In the midst of such disruptions of our understanding of death, the state may 
be particularly concerned to preserve the core understanding that killing is 
not just wrong, but unimaginable. 
This taboo is not aimed just at attitudes toward killing oneself and oth-
ers. It is directed particularly at a group with extraordinary power that resists 
regulation-doctors. Thus Kass and Lund invoke "a centuries-old taboo 
against medical killing, a taboo understood by many to be one of the corner-
stones of the medical ethic."140 They explain, 
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Medical students, interns, and residents are taught-and acquire-a 
profound repugnance to medical killing, as a major defense against 
committing-or even contemplating-the worst action to which their 
arrogance and/or their weaknesses might lead them. At the same time, 
they are taught not always to oppose death .... But in order to be able 
to keep their balance, physicians have insisted on the absolute distinc-
tion between deliberate killing and letting die. Non-medical laymen 
(including lawyers and judges) may not be impressed with this distinc-
tion, but for practicing physicians it is morally crucial. 141 
The state's interest in the taboo against killing, then, helps explain the 
apparently arbitrary lines between killing and letting die of which the Ninth 
and Second Circuits complained. Arbitrary they may in some ways be, but 
they reflect and affirm social understandings on which crucial taboos rest. 
The state's "symbolic and aspirational" interest in human life has a sec-
ond element. The principal problem with suicide is not that a few dying peo-
ple have trouble committing it, but that many people-particularly young 
people-commit it who have not made a wise, or even competent, deci-
sion.142 Criminal prohibitions of suicide are so futile they have long since 
been abandoned, and thus the state's challenge is again to promote a social 
environment that deters suicide. Dignifying suicide by medicalizing it and 
calling it a constitutional right seems likely to corrupt that environment. 
I would even make-if cautiously-a third argument-that the state has 
an interest in helping patients respond well to the shock and horror of mor-
tal illness. When people encounter any new and daunting situation, they 
rarely wish to work out from first principles how to cope with it. Rather, they 
often wish to consult common practice. As Alan Wolfe writes, "When people 
make decisions, they tend to look not to a mathematical formula to deter-
mine what is to their best advantage, but to what others do, to what they 
have traditionally done, or to what they think others think they ought to 
do. "143 The sick particularly need this social assistance in making decisions, 
not just because their situation is often so unfamiliar, but because it is so 
frightening. Thus one student of the memoirs people write about illness ob-
serves, "Perhaps one reason why the work of dying seems so difficult today is 
that the individual is expected not only to face his or her death-in itself a 
task arduous enough-but also create a way of dying out of the fragments of 
ideologies and religious sentiments that our culture provides us."144 This 
does not tell us, of course, which social practices might most comfort and 
sustain the dying. But I think the state may decide that in general they will 
benefit most from practices that do not make suicide a standard resort, 
which encourage the dying to maintain their ties with the living and to seek 
the rewards life has yet to give them. 145 
Here I do not think the Ninth Circuit is helpful. The right it announced 
was rooted in the view that dependence must be deplorable and undignified. 
The court, for instance, says "a terminally ill adult who ends his life in the 
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final stages of an incurable and painful degenerative disease" might do so 
partly "to avoid ... a humiliating death."146 But why must such a death be 
humiliating? As Callahan acutely says, "What Reinhardt has done, in effect, 
is to bless a trivial, even demeaning, notion of dignity. What could be more 
mischievous than a view of dignity that requires we be clean, alert, and able 
to take care of ourselves?" 147 
The Ninth Circuit might have argued that all three of these state inter-
ests are illegitimate because in promoting them the state makes itself di-
rectly interested in people's preferences. However, the state is not seeking to 
override those preferences, only to shape them, or even to shape the forces 
that shape them. Some of these preferences-like not wanting to kill-the 
state is not just entitled but is even obliged to shape. But the state may legit-
imately shape the forces that influence other preferences. We will always be 
shaped by our environments. We maximize our autonomy by shaping the 
environments that shape us. But many of those environments-including 
the hospitals in which American deaths today occur-are virtually impervi-
ous to us unless we use that one great tool, government. Seen in this way, 
government is not just a threat to autonomy, but a device we recruit to pro-
tect ourselves from other threats to our autonomy. For example, Karnisar 
asks, "In a climate in which suicide is the 'rational' thing to do, or at least a 
'reasonable' option, will it become the unreasonable thing not to do? The 
noble thing to do?" 148 And David Velleman suggests that the dying might 
sometimes prefer not to have the choice to commit suicide so that they 
might escape any sense of duty to do so.149 Since a truly neutral environment 
seems impossible, citizens may (within important limits) properly employ 
the state's power to protect themselves from unfavorable environments. 
The "collective" state interests extend beyond the expressive function. 
For example, instituting a right to assisted suicide might well reduce the 
presently strong incentive to create better ways to help the sick and dying. 
Consider the hospice movement. It has helped transform palliative care and 
provide decent and dedicated care for dying patients who have decided to 
abandon their struggle for a cure. But as Kass and Lund fear, "Because the 
quick-fix of suicide is easy and cheap, it will in many cases replace the use of 
hospice and other humanly-engaged forms of palliative care, for there will be 
much less economic incentive to continue building and supporting social 
and institutional arrangements for giving humane care to the dying." 150 
Hendin believes this has already happened in Holland, where "the easy so-
lution of euthanasia or assisted suicide has led to a third kind of slippage: a 
diminution in the quality of and pressure for palliative care, which became 
one of the first casualties of euthanasia. Hospice care has indeed been vir-
tually non-existent in the Netherlands."151 
Had it thought about what I am calling the state's collective interests, 
the Ninth Circuit would no doubt have objected to them. It would have said 
that it is hard for courts to evaluate them because taboos do their work indi-
rectly, because preferences are shaped in labyrinthine ways, because social 
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institutions are born of many forces. No doubt. But these are reasons courts 
should judge collective interests perceptively and shrewdly, not reject them 
out of hand. Such state interests matter, and a jurisprudence too crude to 
respect them is poorly suited for making bioethical policy. 
Assessing the State's Interests 
In Compassion in Dying, Washington asserted a number of interests, none 
of which struck the Ninth Circuit as weighty. I have suggested that the court 
was hostile to the state's account of its interests for two reasons: because of 
the structure of Fourteenth Amendment analysis, which typically scants 
state interests, and because the court was ill-informed about the bases for 
the state's claim. I suspect the Fourteenth Amendment tradition of dismiss-
ing state interests helps account for the court's abrupt treatment of many of 
Washington's asserted interests, particularly what I have called collective in-
terests. And in Compassion in Dying that abrupt treatment was particularly 
easy because the court was so poorly informed. The list of its misperceptions 
is long. The court did not seem to understand: the doctrine of double effect 
and how doctors and patients regard it; the inescapable imprecision of "ter-
minally ill"; the extent to which depression motivates the suicide even of 
terminally ill people; the difficulty of diagnosing depression; how doctors and 
patients interact; how patients make decisions; why terminally ill people 
want to commit suicide; how the disadvantaged make choices at the end of 
life; the effects of changes in American health care on decisions to die; the 
difficulty of writing effective regulations in this area; the modest capacity of 
doctors to prevent unwise decisions to commit suicide; the Dutch experi-
ence; or the probable effects of assisted suicide on doctors. 
My point has not been that the state's interests require it to prohibit as-
sisted suicide, for I do not believe they do. Nor is my primary point that the 
state's interests justify the state's statute, although I believe they do. What I 
have argued, rather, is that the Ninth Circuit seems to understand the 
state's interests so poorly and to dismiss them so facilely as to cast doubt on 
the court's capacity to make good public policy at least for this bioethical 
issue. 
Making Policy by Weighing Rights and Interests 
Once the individual rights and the state interests at stake in a case have been 
surveyed, standard Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence calls for the 
court to judge whether the latter are strong enough to justify the statute's in-
fringement of the former. This is surely a necessary step in making wise pol-
icy. But it is not one a court is well equipped to take. 
The problems begin at the theoretical level. First, the Supreme Court 
has been unable to specify what standard to use in evaluating competing 
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rights and interests. 152 Its failure is disconcerting but understandable, since 
the personal right and the state interest are incommensurable. This awk-
wardness might be avoided if a court only needed to decide if the right and 
the interests had each attained some specified standard, and this is what the 
Court for some time tried to require. Its system, however, proved too rigid, 
and the Court's categories proliferated and now seem to have collapsed. The 
Ninth Circuit's response to this defeat was to try to "balance" the right and 
the interests. But this simply returned it to the core problem of incommen-
surability-that there is no scale on which rights and interests can be 
weighed. And this revived the old problem of substantive due process-that 
it requires judges to make so many poorly guided choices that it invites them 
to read their own policy preferences into constitutional law. 
Far from acknowledging these problems, the Ninth Circuit said proudly, 
Weighing and then balancing a constitutionally-protected interest 
against the state's countervailing interests, while bearing in mind the 
various consequences of the decision, is quintessentially a judicial role. 
Despite all of the efforts of generations of courts to categorize and ob-
jectify, to create multi-part tests and identify weights to be attached to 
the various factors, in the end balancing entails the exercise of judicial 
judgment rather than the application of scientific or mathematical for-
mulae. No legislative body can perform the task for us. Nor can any 
computer. In the end, ... we must rely on our judgment, guided by 
the facts and the law as we perceive them. 153 
This passage seems wrong-headed at every turn. First, far from being 
"quintessentially a judicial role," weighing and balancing constitutional 
rights against the state's interests is at the beginning a task the legislature 
can and should undertake every time its acts implicate a constitutional 
right. 154 Second, the judicial failure to "categorize and objectify" critically 
erodes the court's authority to override the legislature's balance. One condi-
tion for granting power to unelected courts is that they must explain the 
source of their authority and the logic of their decision. Third, the court 
seems to concede at the end of this passage that it is essentially relying on its 
own "judgment." It never explains what makes its judgment worthier of re-
spect than the legislature's or even why its judgment might yield good policy. 
On the contrary, the court unnervingly intimates that it can rely first and 
primarily on its own judgment and only need have that judgment guided by 
"the facts and the law as we perceive them." 
But even a court less insouciant than the Ninth Circuit would face dis-
abling problems balancing rights and interests in a case like Compassion in 
Dying. Consider what it would take to develop a genuinely informed policy 
about assisted suicide. Historically, courts have been content to announce 
an individual interest of some specified weight and ask if the state has a 
countervailing interest of some specified strength. But in making policy, 
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other questions are relevant. First, how many people would want to exercise 
the right? This matters, since good policy asks what a statute's total benefit 
and total harm are. 
The Ninth Circuit has no idea how many people would actually assert 
the right. Perhaps swayed by the plaintiffs' stories, the court insistently says 
"many."155 But it never tells us what "many" means or how accurate it is. 
The court needs to answer these questions because "many" may well be 
wrong. A good estimate should start with everyone who is terminally ill and 
mentally competent. From this group must be subtracted all those-clearly 
the huge majority-who do not want to commit suicide. 156 From the re-
maining patients must be subtracted all those who can die by refusing med-
ical treatment. Then one must subtract those who have been unduly pres-
sured into committing suicide or who have improvidently decided to do so. 157 
Then should be subtracted those who could achieve their goals by a means 
other than suicide-for example, by entering a hospice or securing proper 
pain medication. From those (few?) who are left must be subtracted those 
who could commit suicide satisfactorily without help, for what is at issue is 
not the right to commit suicide (which is nowhere criminal) but the right to 
help in doing so. As Campbell writes, "Patients already have access to infor-
mation about how to end their lives, and 'stockpiling' of medications has in 
many instances given them access to the means to end life. "158 And perhaps 
one should also subtract those who will have assistance whatever the law 
says, for "press reports and polls suggest that some physicians already re-
spond to their patients' requests for help by prescribing medication or pro-
viding a lethal injection."159 Finally, one must subtract those patients for 
whom even physician-assisted suicide would not provide the deliverance 
they sought. 160 Perhaps this leaves "many" candidates, but a good policy 
maker would at least be on notice to inquire in some serious way. 
So the first thing we would need to know in weighing the costs and ben-
efits of making assisted suicide a right is how many people would want to ex-
ercise it. Second, we would want to know how much worse off these people 
would be were they denied suicide instead of being relegated to their next 
choice. This is another inquiry the court seems quite uninterested in, even 
though it is quite possible that the marginal benefits of assisted suicide 
would turn out to be quite low. Third, we would want to know what collateral 
benefits suicides might bring (to families relieved of the burden of caring, 
paying, and sorrowing for their ill; to society saved the costs of medical care; 
to dying people in general, who might find comfort in knowing they could es-
cape their travail). 
Such calculations would begin to give us a sense of the benefits of a 
right to assisted suicide. We would also, of course, calculate the benefits of 
prohibiting it. We would ask first how many people would make a nondefec-
tive decision to commit suicide, would be deterred by a statute prohibiting it, 
and would be glad they had been deterred. Second, we would ask how many 
people would make a defective decision to commit suicide. Third, we would 
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ask how many friends or family members would benefit should a suicide be 
prevented. 
The preceding paragraphs suggest how complex the court's task would 
be even if it simply tried to specify the numbers of people who might be in-
jured or helped by a regime of assisted suicide. These are not inquiries at 
which courts are likely to excel or even attempt. Courts specialize in deter-
mining what happened in some past event, not in trying to predict who 
might be affected by a reform that has not even been instituted. Yet even if 
the court could make these predictions, it would still need some way of as-
signing a weight to each kind of benefit and burden. And this is without even 
considering the perplexities of measuring what I have called the state's col-
lective interests, its interests in attitudes and institutions. In short, as Justice 
Brandeis wrote, 
Merely to acquire the knowledge essential as a basis for the exercise 
of this multitude of judgments would be a formidable task; and each 
of the thousands of these judgments would call for some measure of 
prophecy. Even more serious are the obstacles to success inherent in 
the demands which execution of the project would make upon human 
intelligence and upon the character of men. Man is weak and his judg-
ment is at best fallible. 161 
The standard response substantive-due-process jurisprudence makes to 
these onerous inquiries is to accord precedence to the individual rights at 
stake. As I once explained: 
Ordinarily, we talk in terms of what I have called the Mill paradigm: 
"That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of a person's ac-
tions. In such conflicts, we are predisposed to favor the person, out of 
respect for his moral autonomy and human dignity. "162 That predispo-
sition also rests on our assumption that the state can bear any risks of 
an incorrect decision better than the individual can. 163 
Such is the Ninth Circuit's approach: "The consequences of rejecting the 
as-applied challenge would be disastrous for the terminally ill, while the ad-
verse consequences for the state would be of a far lesser order."164 However, 
the Mill paradigm works only where the contest is between an individual's 
rights and the interests of the state. That is not this case. Rather, this is a 
contest between some individuals who want to commit suicide and other in-
dividuals who have an interest in being protected from making a defective 
and incompetent decision to commit suicide. These interests conflict. We 
cannot favor the individual against the state, because some individuals will 
be harmed whatever we do. The Mill paradigm leads us to worry more about 
limiting individual rights than injuring the state's interests because the state 
can take its lumps better than individuals. But here individuals will suffer ei-
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ther way, and their autonomy interests will be injured either way. In other 
words, part of the problem is that the court's categories-individual rights 
and state interests-obscure the social realities it confronts. 
The Ninth Circuit boasts that "balancing" individual rights and the 
state's interests is "quintessentially a judicial task." In this section, I have sug-
gested that the court's faith in its skill seems to rest on its underestimate of 
the challenges of that task. The court does not seem to appreciate how many 
identifiable groups stand to lose or gain from a regime of assisted 
suicide, how hard it is to predict the number of members of each group, how 
tricky it is to evaluate their interests (in health, in life, in happiness), how per-
plexing it is to assign weights to the state's collective interests, and 
how impossible it therefore is to balance all the interests involved. To be sure, 
these problems will harass any institution that must evaluate assisted suicide. 
But what makes the court think itself so excellently suited to handle them? 
The Culture of the Case 
I have suggested that their training, experience, and resources poorly equip 
judges for making bioethical policy, and I have tried to show how truncated 
the analysis in even the court's lengthy opinion in Compassion in Dying was. 
I now want to examine these problems from a different angle. American 
judges and lawyers live in what we may call the culture of the case. That cul-
ture makes the case the focal point of law. That view grows out of our com-
mon law system (in which law is made by judges in cases) and out of the 
American legal faith that even statutes and the Constitution find their mean-
ing only when interpreted by courts in cases. American legal education too 
reflects the culture of the case, for we teach law primarily through books that 
compile cases. Cases are thus central to American law, and the culture of 
the case shapes the way courts think and act. It does so in ways that may per-
haps promote the efficient settlement of disputes but that impede making 
wise policy. This is largely because a system developed to resolve disputes be-
tween two individuals or enterprises ordinarily promotes neither the atti-
tudes nor the practices that conduce to making good social policy. 
First, the culture of the case leads judges to believe they need historical, 
not social facts. "Historical facts are the events that have transpired between 
the parties to a lawsuit. Social facts are the recurrent patterns of behavior on 
which policy must be based."165 Courts tend to believe that social facts may 
be inferred from historical facts, that the litigants before them represent the 
facts needed to make policy. This is rarely true in cases of social importance. 
Anyone might become terminally ill, and the circumstances of the dying dif-
fer enormously, but lawyers will present to the court only a few litigants 
whose vivid but unrepresentative stories are virtually intended to mislead 
the court about the social problem. 166 People who might be injured by a right 
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to assisted suicide, on the other hand, are likely to be invisible to the court. 
This is partly because they are hard to identify individually, especially in ad-
vance. As Arras writes, "The victims oflegalization, ... will be largely hidden 
from view: they will include the clinically depressed eighty-year-old man 
who could have lived for another year of good quality [and] ... the fifty-year-
old woman who asks for death because doctors in her financially stretched 
health maintenance organization cannot or will not effectively treat her un-
relenting but mysterious pelvic pain .... "167 Furthermore, the state appears 
before the court only in the drab person of a government attorney, not as a 
suffering individual. Thus the court never puts a human face on those who 
might be rescued from suicide or who might wrongly be led into it. Yet in my 
experience judges often grow impatient with Brandeis briefs that try to pro-
vide systematic information about social facts. As an eminent jurist once said 
to me when I suggested there might be systematic information on a legal 
problem: "I know other people live differently from the way I do, and I'm not 
interested." One result is the superficial treatment of social facts I cata-
logued earlier in the third section of this chapter. 
The second feature of the culture of the case is that it draws judges to-
ward what I call "hyper-rationalism." Hyper-rationalism may be both 
methodological and substantive. As a method, it "is essentially the substitu-
tion ofreason for information and analysis. It has two components: first, the 
belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is un-
available or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts 
through a [narrow] set ofartificial analytic categories."168 Hyper-rationalism, 
in other words, tempts us to believe we can understand how people think 
and act merely by reasoning, without investigating. 
Methodological hyper-rationalism, then, offers a rationale for a way of un-
derstanding and writing about social problems. Substantive hyper-rationalism 
furnishes the assumptions about how people think and act that stand in for 
the information that might be garnered from empirical work. In bioethics, as 
in many other areas of human thought, these assumptions tend to see peo-
ple as operating in remarkably rational ways. They hold that people deliber-
ate explicitly about their situations, that they do so in predominantly rational 
terms, that they are autonomy maximizers, and that they have well-worked-
out agendas that they need autonomy to implement. These assumptions see 
people primarily as makers of decisions reaching out for control over their 
lives. Finally, while these assumptions do not entirely abstract people from 
their social contexts, they tend to simplify those contexts deplorably .169 
Courts succumb to hyper-rationalism because they share the common 
belief that things are generally what they seem and because the alternative 
is a daunting empirical inquiry_l7° Hyper-rationalism is a shortcut that per-
mits judges to cope with their workload. In addition, hyper-rationalism per-
mits courts that have become committed to a result to reach it without hav-
ing to explain away awkward evidence. It is hard to say which of these 
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motives most influenced the Ninth Circuit, but it is easy to point to examples 
of its hyper-rationalism. For example, the court wrote airily, 
We believe that most, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally ill 
patient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable 
chance of alleviating the patient's suffering or enabling him to live 
under tolerable conditions. We also believe that physicians would not 
assist a patient to end his life if there were any significant doubt about 
the patient's true wishes. To do so would be contrary to the physicians' 
fundamental training, their conservative nature, and the ethics of their 
profession. 171 
This passage purports to describe how doctors behave. It does so not by prof-
fering evidence, but rather by positing that doctors have a nature that pre-
dictably governs their behavior. Just as boldly, the court assumes that doc-
tors do what they are trained to do and what their professional ethics 
command. This requires us to believe that the court correctly describes doc-
tors' training, nature, and ethics and-improbably-that doctors will not be 
subject to forces (like cost-conscious HMOs, or overwork, or importunate 
patients, laziness, or a bad temper) that lead them to ignore their training, 
nature, and ethics. The court hardly tries to substantiate its assumptions, 
and I have argued that many of them are unlikely. 
As it has developed, the culture of the case has a third defect. American 
lawyers tend to see each case as standing for one primary idea. They com-
monly ask what the holding in a case is, or what its principle is. This is sig-
nificant for two reasons. First, it implies that sound results can be reached 
purely through the analysis of principles. Second, it suggests that the core 
problems of a case can usually be solved by a single principle. 172 The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, essentially thought that Compassion in Dying could be 
decided by adumbrating the principle of autonomy. Often, however, good 
policy arises not out of applying a single principle, but by reconciling many 
conflicting principles. And often the problem is not to derive principles but 
to understand complex empirical realities. 
This leads us to the fourth problem the culture of the case presents in 
constitutional litigation: it leads to piecemeal resolution of issues that are 
closely related and that should be resolved together with an eye to the costs 
and benefits of each choice. As Michael McCann puts it, "judicial authorities 
are largely bound to episodic case-by-case remedies for complex social prob-
lems at odds with the long-term supervisory capacities necessary for effec-
tive means-oriented planning."173 Both the Ninth and Second Circuits cen-
trally argued that since the state permitted people to die by refusing 
treatment, it must also permit assisted suicide. These courts seemed to feel 
that if the risks of one were tolerable, so must be the risks of the other. 174 
However, good policy would consider the cumulative effects of practices, not 
the effects of each practice separately. Presumably we must tolerate some 
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improvident decisions to die, but eventually their sum may begin to seem too 
great. 
The culture of the case is problematic in a fifth, related, way. Because 
courts consider problems one case at a time, they slide easily down slippery 
slopes. Courts too readily ask what the right result in this case is without in-
vestigating where the new precedent might lead. Anticipating the future is a 
problem for all policy makers. But it is particularly a problem for courts, 
which are commanded to decide only actual cases and controversies. The 
problem becomes insuperable where courts, like the Ninth Circuit, refuse 
even to consider what might lie ahead. 
The culture of the case has other effects. Not least, it leads courts to ig-
nore questions not framed by the doctrine under which suit was brought and 
answers that are not doctrinally available. A court, for instance, is unlikely to 
say that the best response to the desperation of the dying is to improve pal-
liative care, for no constitutional doctrine points in that direction or gives 
courts good tools for effectuating such a judgment. Furthermore, the culture 
of the case tempts courts to twist problems into forms for which judicial 
remedies are available. For example, it might for several reasons be desirable 
to legalize assisted suicide but not to make it a right. However, the only way 
the Ninth Circuit could legalize assisted suicide was by making it a right, and 
that was what it tried to do. 
Some Institutional Considerations 
In the preceding sections, I have argued that courts are poorly equipped to 
analyze the issues bioethical policy presents. In this section, I contend that a 
number of institutional considerations make it desirable that courts not be-
come the arbiters of that policy. These considerations speak not just to judi-
cial disadvantages but to the advantages of other governmental and non-
governmental agencies. 
First, a clarification. Where the Constitution commands courts to en-
force rights, courts must surely do so. There are many areas in which the 
Constitution is uncontroversially understood to issue just such commands 
(even if the substance of each decision may be controversial). However, as I 
argued earlier, assisted suicide is not such a case. And where there is some 
reason to think affected people have been excluded from democratic insti-
tutions, even rights skeptics may want courts to be specially alert for viola-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. But here there are no "discrete and in-
sular minorities." There is no reason to think some group or some point of 
view has been barred from the ballot box or the legislature's hall's. On the 
contrary, everyone risks being in the position of the plaintiffs in Compassion 
in Dying, or their families, or their friends. 175 
But even if courts are not constitutionally commanded to act, do they 
not at least have institutional advantages? Perhaps so, but probably fewer 
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than courts assume. In choosing an institution to make bioethical policy in 
general and assisted-suicide policy in particular, one criterion should be an 
institution's flexibility and its ability to promote-or at least tolerate-social 
experimentation. Experimentation is desirable for two reasons. First, as-
sisted suicide is terra incognita. Much will depend on our ability to regulate 
it. Ifwe can regulate it well, many of the objections to it will evaporate. How-
ever, failures ofregulation are likely to reveal themselves only slowly. For ex-
ample, we are worried about the extent to which routinization will dull the 
regulatory ardor of physicians, and routine develops gradually. We are wor-
ried about slippery slopes, but we slide down them gradually and unwittingly. 
Not only will pathologies grow slowly, but they will be hard to detect and to 
measure. All this means we must be free to reverse our course whenever se-
rious problems become evident. 
The second reason we should value flexibility is that medicine at the 
end of life is a dynamic area in which change is constant and in which law 
must change with change. For example, progress in pain management or 
treating depression would vitiate the rights claim by weakening the argu-
ment that only suicide could offer the patient relief from misery. On the 
other hand, better techniques for diagnosing depression might calm our 
worries that the clinically depressed were being inadvertently helped to die. 
Similarly relevant are the seismic shifts in the structure and financing of 
American medical care. Even apparently fundamental professional attitudes 
may change. For instance, it used to be a commonplace that doctors were 
too eager to keep patients alive, that they were so determined to keep me-
tabolism going, so enthusiastic about technology, and so loath to fail that 
they would prolong life even at the cost of kindness. Today, doctors' attitudes 
have altered strikingly, and the visitor to the ICU will often see doctors coun-
seling patients and families to begin to consider withdrawing treatment. 176 
If flexibility is our goal, constitutional adjudication should not be our 
tool. For one thing, constitutional rights inhibit the experimentation our fed-
eral system is supposed to promote. Justice Brandeis's statement of the point 
is not just familiar, it is right: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country."177 Were the Court to make assisted suicide a con-
stitutional right, all the country would have to permit it, and permit it in the 
specific forms the Court felt were consonant with the right. 
Worse, once courts announce a constitutional opinion, they commonly 
resist changing it. And not without good reason. Stare decisis is crucial to a 
system of case law. Yet courts dislike reconsiderations for less admirable rea-
sons as well. Judges, like the rest ofus, resist admitting error. Once we have 
made up our minds, we usually have a framework of interpretation into 
which we fit new evidence. With that framework, we can be wonderfully in-
genious in interpreting new data to prove that we were right in the first 
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place. As Bacon put it: "The human understanding, once it has adopted 
opinions, either because they were already accepted and believed, or be-
cause it likes them, draws everything else to support and agree with them. 
And though it may meet a greater number and weight of contrary instances, 
it will, with great and harmful prejudice, ignore or condemn or exclude them 
by introducing some distinction, in order that the authority of those earlier 
assumptions may remain intact and unharmed."178 Hence the natural con-
servatism of the decision maker. 
What is more, courts, with their contempt power, readily-and to some 
extent properly-regard resistance as an affront to judicial dignity and to jus-
tice itself. Once a court announces not just an order, but a constitutional 
right, disagreement looks even more like a perfidy that must be met firmly 
and even sternly. As a matter of judicial psychology, the judge who has an-
nounced "the law of the land" tends to become perturbed and then insistent 
when states persist in resisting. When thwarted, courts tend to ask "How 
can these people disobey a lawful order of our court?" instead of "Why are 
people not doing what we expected and wanted?" 
This leads to my next point. I have catalogued ways courts are badly 
equipped to make bioethical policy. But do not judges bring special virtues to 
their work? Perhaps, but those virtues have their own vices and are too often 
absent. One of these virtues is that courts-unlike legislatures-must justify 
their conclusions in principled terms. And so they should. But in Compassion 
in Dying those principled terms often seem ill considered. And Kamisar, a 
cautious and careful scholar even if a zealous partisan, strikingly invokes the 
words of Louis Henkin to describe even the Supreme Court's work: '"Some of 
the Court's unacceptable lines just happen. To avoid difficult questions, to 
support a result dictated by intuition or sympathy, perhaps to achieve a ma-
jority for that result, the Justices seize a rationale that comes to mind, with-
out asking where it leads and whether they are prepared to go there."' 179 
But I would also argue that sometimes a purely principled resolution is 
not the best one. Where people deeply disagree over basic principles (as they 
do about many matters ofbioethical policy), there is much to be said for de-
laying any kind of final decision until there has been a thorough social ex-
amination of the issue and the reasons for disagreement about it. 180 And 
even where such a process has been carried on as long as is fruitful, com-
promise may be morally legitimate and practically desirable. Where reason-
able and decent people vehemently disagree, it is hard to say who is right. 
And the political and social cost of unresolved disagreement is likely to be 
painfully high, as Roe's sequelae attest. 181 So a compromise of the conflict-
ing principles may be necessary. Unfortunately, courts often cannot find a 
legal basis for such a compromise, predict which compromise might work, or 
commit the antagonists to accepting it. 
Assisted suicide seems an attractive case for compromise. Many and 
perplexing are the moral and practical issues it presents. Good-hearted and 
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thoughtful are the adversaries. Indeed, we may already be moving toward 
compromises. One developing pattern is to make assisted suicide a crime but 
not prosecute it. And Kamisar argues that we have already achieved another 
kind of compromise, since "the line between letting die and actively inter-
vening to bring about death represents a cultural and pragmatic compromise 
between the desire to let seriously ill people carry out their wishes to end it 
all and the felt need to protect the weak and the vulnerable."182 
Detachment and dispassion are also said to be virtues judges have and 
others lack. 183 Of course, commitment and passion may be good responses 
to hard problems. But even when detachment and dispassion are desirable, 
judges too often spurn them. The Ninth Circuit has much to regret on this 
score, for its opinion is written in strangely extravagant language. For exam-
ple, the court lauds itself as a barrier to "arbitrary and intrusive" exercises of 
state power. 184 Perhaps Washington's statute is unwise. Perhaps it is uncon-
stitutional. But it is not arbitrary. It is a kind of statute many states-indeed, 
many countries-have long had that plausibly attempts to abate undoubted 
evils. The Ninth Circuit contends the statute balances the competing inter-
ests unwisely, but it hardly attempts to show the statute is arbitrary. (And it 
is odd to call a statute that prohibits a doctor from delivering fatal drugs to a 
patient intrusive.) 
Perhaps we should not repine at such immoderation. But what is surely 
dismaying is the court's harsh and vituperative spirit. The court character-
izes arguments with which it disagrees-even when they are the arguments 
of other judges-as "disingenuous," "fallacious," "meretricious," "ludi-
crous," "nihilistic," "inflammatory," and "disastrous." Yet the court is also 
sanctimonious, self-serving, and self-satisfied. After slurring those imperti-
nent enough to believe the Washington statute is constitutional and jeering 
at their opinions and arguments, the court piously concludes by saying, 
Given the nature of the judicial process and the complexity of the task 
of determining the rights and interests comprehended by the Constitu-
tion, good faith disagreements within the judiciary should not surprise 
or disturb anyone who follows the development of the law. For these 
reasons, we express our hope that whatever debate may accompany 
the future exploration of the issues we have touched on today will be 
conducted in an objective, rational, and constructive manner that will 
increase, not diminish, respect for the Constitution. 185 
Judicial care and caution are missing not just from the language but the 
substance of Compassion in Dying, as many commentators have noted. 
Arras says that "[w]ithin the blink of an eye, a seemingly unmovable consen-
sus within the medical profession, the judiciary, the bioethics community, 
and the general public was unceremoniously overturned."186 Burt writes 
that "the rulings by the Second and Ninth Circuit overturning state laws ex-
plicitly forbidding physician-assisted suicide were not merely novel exercises 
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of constitutional authority. These rulings startlingly impose a legal result 
that was without precedent in any prior state or federal legislative action."187 
Kamisar concludes that those two cases "shattered a general consensus that 
withholding or withdrawing life-saving treatment constitutes neither suicide 
nor assisted suicide nor homicide .... '[T]he moral significance of the dis-
tinction has been subjected to periodic philosophical challenge,' but the dis-
tinction 'has remained a basic tenet of health care law and mainstream med-
ical ethics."'188 The Supreme Court itself said, "To hold for respondents [as 
the Ninth Circuit had done], we would have to reverse centuries oflegal doc-
trine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost 
every State."189 
I have argued that constitutional adjudication is a poor way of making 
bioethical policy. Is there a better way? I believe so. I would certainly not 
argue that any human institution will reliably produce admirable results, 
and I would certainly agree that no other branch of government can meet all 
the high standards for making policy against which I have measured courts. 
But the alternative to constitutional adjudication is not any single institution. 
Rather, it is the whole set of governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions that influence policy where they have not been preempted by constitu-
tional adjudication. 
The debate over assisted suicide has been conducted in many venues. 
The issue has perhaps been discussed most profoundly in the private con-
versations the dying, their doctors, and their families have had. 190 Doctors 
have pondered it in private conversations and professional meetings, and 
their professional groups have developed formal opinions about it. Suicide 
and euthanasia have for years been a staple of debates among bioethicists. 
Many kinds of private associations, from religious groups to organizations 
like Compassion in Dying, have become involved. Journalists have covered 
these activities and many more, and newspaper stories, television reports, 
magazine articles, and books continue to proliferate. Left to their own de-
vices; these unofficial conversations are likely to contribute to a set of un-
official social practices not inevitably inferior to judicial edict. 
Legal institutions of various kinds have likewise been active. Commis-
sions to investigate assisted suicide-notably the New York Task Force-
have been appointed and have written thoughtful reports. Legislative hear-
ings and debates have been conducted. 191 Criminal trials and appeals have 
been held. Five referenda in four states have been placed before the voters. 
In all these ways the processes of democracy have been vigorously and use-
fully at work. 
Nor is assisted suicide the only bioethical topic democratic and private 
institutions have handled actively without the benefit of constitutional adju-
dication. The President's Bioethics Commission drafted a three-volume re-
port that had wide influence, and many state commissions performed simi-
lar services. The definition of death was expanded to include brain death in 
a quiet but effective process in which professional groups presented care-
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fully considered proposals to legislatures to be enacted into law. The legal 
doctrine of informed consent developed through common law adjudication. 
Doctors' attitudes toward withdrawing medical treatment have been consid-
erably moderated through purely private, hardly noticed means. Courts de-
ciding end-of-life cases have even moved away from the constitutional rea-
soning the court used in Quinlan in favor of reasoning based on statutes and 
the common law. 
Each of these institutions has advantages as a bioethical policy maker. 
Together they have many. Most of these institutions have a flexibility courts 
interpreting the Constitution cannot have, for they are generally not bound 
by their previous decisions nor by a particular method. Many of them bring 
expertise to the issue. Commissions are primarily composed of people who 
are already expert or who become so during their work, and they employ ex-
pert staffs. Professional associations are composed of and employ experts. 
Even legislatures usually can find within their ranks a few specialists and 
can hire knowledgeable staffs and recruit expert witnesses. 
These institutions can also control the timing of their decisions; they 
can act when the moment is propitious. Courts, on the other hand, must 
generally act when litigants arrive. For example, one can imagine the 
Supreme Court reaching a different result in Glucksberg had it arisen after 
several years of a successful experiment in Oregon with assisted suicide. 
Many institutions can address issues much more broadly than courts. This is 
partly because some of them command or influence resources that can be 
used in many ways. A legislature, for example, can allocate funds for many 
kinds of programs; courts are essentially confined to a few due process reme-
dies. 
Not least, these institutions represent, can speak directly to, or can bind 
the disputants in a way courts cannot. Thus these institutions are better 
placed to shape a discussion that leads to effective resolutions of disputes. 
Some of these institutions have been admirably creative in trying to do so. 
For example, the Michigan legislature passed a statute criminalizing assisted 
suicide but provided that the statute would have effect only until a commis-
sion with broad representation had examined the problem. 
In sum, courts have a number of institutional disadvantages in making 
bioethical policy. Constitutional adjudication tends to inhibit the flexibility 
policy needs in a dynamic area both by setting a standard states cannot es-
cape and by cementing judges in decisions they have reached. The judicial 
virtues of principled reasoning, detachment, and dispassion-even when 
they are useful virtues-are not always practiced assiduously, and certainly 
were not in Compassion in Dying. No single institution does possess all the 
virtues a good policy maker needs. But the other branches of government, 
along with the many interested private organizations, are better placed to 
consider issues expertly and thoroughly, to act at the right moment, to reach 
compromises, to develop complex answers to complex problems, and to re-
spond flexibly to the continuing course of change. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that constitutional adjudication is a poor way to make bioeth-
ical policy. My reasons have been several. First, little in the training or expe-
rience of judges prepares them to make good public policy in most areas, 
including this one. Second, little in the text or even the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment helps judges make good bioethical policy. Nor has the 
Court been able to develop doctrine that has a convincing rationale or that 
seems to help it formulate wise policy. Such a doctrine would require that 
the Court be able to explain the principles it was consulting, would specify 
the limits on those principles, would state workable tests to employ in apply-
ing them, and would use those tests reasonably and predictably. Such a doc-
trine remains elusive. 
Third, constitutional litigation is a poor way to gather the social facts 
necessary for making good public policy, and many judges even doubt they 
need them. This has meant courts have not demonstrated that they under-
stand the issues assisted suicide raises. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
seems not to have grasped how doctors and ethicists have understood the 
doctrine of double effect nor the consequences of rejecting that doctrine. It 
seems not to know where the problem in defining "terminally ill" lies nor 
how hard it is to do so. It appears not to have understood how common de-
pression is among the suicidal, how often it goes undiagnosed, or how treat-
able it is. It seems to have a naive view of human motivation generally, of the 
motives of the ill particularly, and yet more particularly, of the motives of the 
suicidal. It seems not to realize why people worry about the disadvantaged in 
a world where assisted suicide is a constitutional right. It does not seem to 
perceive the ways new economic concerns and new organizational struc-
tures create new incentives to hasten the dying along their way. It seems 
oddly optimistic about how well doctors might regulate the process of sui-
cide. The court seems ignorant of the contemporary ethos of medicine, of 
the way medical decisions are made, of how doctors deal with patients, of the 
reasons for the origins of bioethics, and of the regulatory problems Holland 
has yet to solve. Nor does much in the court's information prepare it to 
speculate intelligently about how a new regime will work out in practice. 
What is more, judicial formulas systematically underweight the state's 
interests. Some of those interests, as I just said, courts seem not to under-
stand. Less concrete but still important factors-the state's "collective" in-
terests-courts abruptly dismiss. And courts are not equipped to evaluate 
the cumulative costs of the rights it and other institutions create. Further-
more, the Court has found no principled way to gauge the heft of the indi-
vidual's right or the state interests so as to weigh the two against each other. 
On the contrary, the balance is unduly weighed in favor of the individual's 
rights by the judicial tendency to apply the Mill paradigm, to treat every con-
test as one between the individual and the state rather than as a conflict 
among individuals with divergent interests. 
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In the end, it should not be surprising that courts are so limited as an 
agency of public policy. They are the institution ultimately responsible for al-
locating power among the branches of the federal government and the 
states; defining free speech; structuring religious liberty; setting the bound-
aries of criminal procedure; deciding when regulations exceed the govern-
ment's power to take property without compensation; specifying the mini-
mal procedural rights governmental agencies must accord clients; writing 
some of the basic rules for resolving problems ofrace; interpreting every fed-
eral statute; and much, much more. Responsible for so much, courts can 
understand only a little. The government of courts must be the government 
of amateurs. 
In sum, the institutions of democracy-public, semipublic, and pri-
vate-have been working together to shape our policies toward assisted sui-
cide. They are reaching plausible conclusions. Together, they are placed to 
make better bioethical policy than a court acting as the interpreter of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Together they are actually writing better policy 
than the federal courts when they have tried to write it. (The Supreme 
Court's success was to decline the invitation.) These institutions have yet 
another advantage. They are the voice of democracy. That voice is not pure; 
it is not unflawed; it is not infallible. But assisted suicide is an issue that can 
affect anyone, that everyone can speak to. In fact, it is an issue as to which 
an exceptionally large proportion of the population has an opinion. 192 We 
value democratic government partly because it allows the people affected by 
a decision to help make it. When courts take decisions away from demo-
cratic institutions, courts should be able to advance convincing reasons and 
to assure us that their job will be done well. I have argued that courts can 
offer no such assurances when they take bioethical policy into their own 
hands. 
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